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THE TEXTUALIZATION OF PRECEDENT
Peter M. Tiersma*
The municipal law of England... may with sufficient propriety be
divided into two kinds; the lex non scripta, the unwritten or common
law; and the lex scripta, the written, or statute law.
-Sir William Blackstone1
INTRODUCTION
In the English-speaking world, there are traditionally two major
sources of law: statutes and judicial opinions. The former consist of
written texts that have been carefully drafted in advance and which
have been scrutinized and formally enacted by a legislature. Deter-
mining the meaning of statutes generally involves close textual analy-
sis. Legislation thus came to be called lex scripta ("written law"). In
contrast, judicial opinions were traditionally pronounced orally from
the bench, and were thus known as lex non scripta ("unwritten law").
Figuring out what an opinion meant-determining the ratio
decidendi or holding of a case-required engaging in the process of
legal reasoning. This unwritten law made by judges has long been
touted by the legal profession, especially in England, as being in many
ways superior to the written enactments of the legislature.
Given the massive numbers ofjudicial opinions or judgments that
have been preserved in writing since the thirteenth century, the
notion that the common law is unwritten seems like a quaint myth, or
at least an anachronism. Yet there is a surprising amount of truth to
© 2007 Peter M. Tiersma. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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the notion that the common law resided in the memories of judges
and the select group of barristers who practiced before them. In fact,
a remarkable amount of orality has survived in the English common
law. Even today, English judicial opinions need not necessarily be
written down by the judge or by a reporter to have precedential force.
And traditional legal reasoning remains a critical skill for English
lawyers.
In the United States, however, the common law is embarking on
a path towards becoming increasingly textual, just as statutes have
been for hundreds of years. It is no exaggeration to say that in this
country, the common law consists of what judges write in their opin-
ions. What they think or what they say during the proceedings before
them is almost entirely irrelevant. As a result, it is less and less neces-
sary to search for the holding or ratio decidendi of a case; the judge
writing for the majority will often specify exactly what the holding is in
carefully crafted text that is meant to fetter the discretion of lower
courts in the same way that a statute does. As a consequence, legal
reasoning is gradually being supplanted by close reading.
More than two decades ago, Guido Calabresi wrote of the grow-
ing "statutorification" of American law.2 Much of what was tradition-
ally the domain of common law is now governed by statute.
Oftentimes these statutes become obsolete. Calabresi's proposed rem-
edy was to allow courts to update antiquated statutes. In essence,
courts would treat legislation as though it were part of the common
law.3 But what Calabresi anticipated has not come to pass. Rather
than treating statutes as common law, courts are beginning to treat
the common law as legislation.
Minds will differ on whether this transformation is good or bad.
There are many consequences that flow from writing down the law in
an authoritative way, something that I call textualization. One of the
most significant consequences is that the law becomes more transpar-
ent and less susceptible to subtle manipulation. The other side of the
coin, of course, is that it becomes more rigid. Rules that reside in
memory tend to be more conceptual. They can evolve-consciously
or not-as circumstances change. Textualized law, on the other
hand, places greater interpretive constraints on those who apply it,
and it can usually be changed only by formal amendment or overrul-
ing, which can be a slow and cumbersome process.
Complicating the picture is that as the common law becomes ever
more textual, the very notion of written text is undergoing dramatic
2 Gumo CALABRP S, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
3 Id. at2.
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and largely unpredictable changes. Paper is being replaced by pixels.
Even though a computer display can mimic a text on paper, there are
significant differences between them. Accessing a large corpus of writ-
ten or printed information traditionally requires an index or digest of
some sort, which means that a human being must categorize the con-
tent in some way. Accessing electronic text, on the other hand, typi-
cally involves requesting a machine to locate sequences of text that
exactly match a search term. Moreover, publication, once an impor-
tant emblem of the authority of a judicial opinion, is undergoing
profound transformations in a culture where anyone can publish
whatever he wants on the Internet. It seems likely that these develop-
ments, especially the massive increase in available cases and the ease
with which they can be accessed online, will only intensify the shift
from legal reasoning to close reading.
I should emphasize that this Article is more prophecy than empir-
ical observation. To be more exact, it is prophecy based upon obser-
vation. There is no doubt that the common law and the nature of
precedent have undergone dramatic changes during the past century
or two, especially in the United States. What will ultimately result
from these developments remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that
American judicial opinions are far more textual than opinions or
judgments made in the past. It seems inevitable that this trend will
have important implications for the concept of precedent and the
nature of common law adjudication.
This Article begins in Part I by describing how the "unwritten"
common law was prized by great lawyers like Coke, Hale, and Black-
stone as being more flexible than legislation. In large part, the flexi-
bility of the common law derived from the fact that judges did not
enact the rules and principles in the way that the legislature enacted
rules of behavior in statutes. The textual mode of interpreting legisla-
tion, involving close reading of the text, was therefore held to be inap-
propriate in understanding the common law. Instead, the principles
of the common law had to be derived by means of legal reasoning
from judicial opinions. Those opinions (or 'judgments," as they are
usually called in England) have traditionally been issued orally and
seriatim. Of course, there was generally a lawyer in court who later
created a written report of the proceedings, but the reports were not
verbatim transcriptions and all too often were of questionable accu-
racy. This tradition has heavily influenced how opinions, as well as the
notion of precedent more generally, are understood by English law-
yers and judges.
We will then examine in Part II how the notion of precedent has
changed in the United States. As opposed to customary English prac-
20071 118 9
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tice, American opinions are invariably written down by the judges
themselves. Often a single opinion speaks in a unified voice for the
majority. There is a clear hierarchy of courts, where lower tribunals
must follow precedents established by higher courts. Moreover, the
legal profession has authentic copies of the courts' opinions at its dis-
posal. Finally, many American jurisdictions have adopted a rule that
to function as precedent, an opinion must not just have been written,
but it must have been ordered to be published (or "certified" for
publication).
These practices have led to the common law in the United States
becoming ever more textual. A hundred years ago judges tended to
express their opinions in conceptual terms, indicated by the use of
phrases such as "we think" or "in our opinion." Recently, they have
become inclined to lay down fixed rules and principles, prefaced by
the increasingly popular phrase "we hold."
The Article concludes in Part III by considering the conse-
quences of these developments, especially as they influence what we
mean when we say that our judicial system is governed by "precedent."
Not surprisingly, the situation is in a state of flux because of rapid
changes in the technology of writing and publication. An intriguing
possibility, suggested by opponents of rules limiting the citation of
unpublished opinions, is that we ought to return to a more pristine
version of the common law, where all judicial decisions can function
as precedents. But can we really turn back the clock? And if we can,
should we?
It may be that because of the large size of the legal profession in
the United States, the huge amount of case law that has developed in
the past few decades, and the impact of technology, some measure of
textualization of precedent is simply inevitable. Perhaps we should
just learn to manage it as best we can.
I. THF "UNw xrrEN" ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW
Unlike statutes, which in some form or other were being written
down at a relatively early stage, and which soon came to be known as
"written law," the other major source of law in the Anglo-American
legal system-the common law-was long glorified as "unwritten
law."4 Francis Bacon wrote that the common law "is no text law, but
4 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *63 ("The municipal law of England, or the
rule of civil conduct prescribed to the inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient
propriety be divided into two kinds; the lex non scripta, the unwritten, or common law;
and the lex scripta, the written, or statute law."). On the notion that judge-made com-
mon law was superior to written law, see RichardJ. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early
[VOL. 82:31190
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the substance of it consisteth in the series and succession of Judicial
Acts from time to time which have been set out in the books which we
term Year Books."5 Several decades later, Matthew Hale, chief justice
of the King's Bench in the mid-seventeenth century, described the dis-
tinction between written and unwritten law as follows:
The Laws of England may aptly enough be divided into two Kinds,
viz. Lex Scripta, the written Law; and Lex non Scripta, the unwritten
Law: For although (as shall be shewn hereafter) all the Laws of this
Kingdom have some Monuments or Memorials thereof in Writing,
yet all of them have not their Original in Writing, for some of those
Laws have obtain'd their Force by immemorial Usage or Custom,
and such Laws are properly call'd Leges non Scriptae, or unwritten
Laws or Customs.
6
Hale goes on to observe that the notion of the common law being
"unwritten" should not be taken too literally:
I do not mean as if all those Laws were only Oral, or communicated
from the former Ages to the later, merely by Word. For all those
Laws have their several Monuments in Writing, whereby they are
transferr'd from one Age to another, and without which they would
soon lose all kind of Certainty ... those Laws of England which are
not comprized under the Title of Acts of Parliament, are for the
most part extant in Records of Pleas, Proceedings and Judgments,
in Books of Reports, and Judicial Decisions, in Tractates of Learned
Men's Arguments and Opinions, preserved from ancient Times,
and still extant in Writing .... I therefore stile those Parts of the
Law, Leges non Scriptae, because their Authoritative and Original
Institutions are not set down in Writing in that Manner, or with that
Authority that Acts of Parliament are, but they are grown into Use,
and have acquired their binding Power and the Force of Laws by a
long and immemorial Usage, and by the Strength of Custom and
Reception in this Kingdom.7
Thus, the mere act of writing did not by itself turn custom or the
common law into lex scripta. Hale was essentially saying that the com-
mon law, at least in his day, had not been textualized in the sense that
statutory law had. Judges did not issue written opinions or judgments
Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640, 10 YALEJ.L.
& HuMAN. 229, 313 (1998).
5 WILLIAM CRADDOCK BOLLAND, THE YEAR BooKs 22 (1921) (quoting Francis
Bacon).
6 MArTHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 3 (John Clive
ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1713).
7 Id. at 16-17.
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in the way that Parliament had come to enact statutes. In fact, even
today, the common law of England remains remarkably oral.
We will see that during the past century or two, common law adju-
dication has become increasingly textual, especially in the United
States. This change is gradually precipitating a different conceptual-
ization of the notion of precedent. But before we move on to con-
sider how precedent is being textualized, let us to consider the
comments of Hale and other English lawyers, both before and after
him, extolling the unwritten nature of the common law. Closely
related, of course, is the notion that the decisions of judges, whether
written down or oral, did not constitute the common law, but were
merely evidence of it.8
A. Early Common Law
The term "common law" has always been somewhat vague. I will
use it here to refer to the uncodified (or nonstatutory) rules and prin-
ciples applied by judges to decide the cases that came before them.
English judges generally claimed that the principles they used to
decide cases were derived from, as Hale put it, "immemorial Usage
and Custom."9 No doubt, when there was an applicable custom that
came to mind and suggested a reasonable resolution to a dispute,
early judges would have used it. But many issues would not have been
resolvable by custom or usage, and in such cases the invocation of
custom might have been just a fiction that lent some legitimacy to the
fact that the judges were actually making new law.
What is critical for our purposes is not the origin of common law
rules, which has been much debated, but that this system of adjudica-
tion and judicial lawmaking could work, and for a long time did work,
without deeming it necessary to set down its principles in authoritative
written form. If the common law was written down, it was done by
commentators, not by the judges who created it. In that sense it truly
was lex non scripta.
It is worth observing that for a system of precedent to operate it is
not necessary that judges encapsulate their decisions in writing, or
even for a written record to be produced. What is essential is some
type of institutional memory of how past cases have been decided. In
medieval England, this institutional memory was possessed by a small,
closely-knit group of judges and barristers (or serjeants) who dis-
8 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *71 (" [W]e may take it as a general rule, 'that the
decisions of courts of justice are the evidence of what is common law'....").
9 See HALE, supra note 6, at 3.
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cussed and debated the law both in court and out. 0 It did not hurt,
of course, that in the formative period of the common law there was
simply less law to remember.
Over time, the common law became more complex. Every year
added to the body of decisions to be borne in mind. Although it
might have been possible for long-practicing lawyers to remember the
more important judgments being rendered in Westminster Hall,
apprentices wishing to become members of the bar would have had a
lot to learn. And even experienced lawyers and judges would have
appreciated written notes of cases to bolster their memories. So, not
long after the establishment of the royal courts and the legal profes-
sion over the course of the thirteenth century, we find written reports
of cases made by people who were present in the courtroom. These
documents, which came to be called Year Books, reported court pro-
ceedings from the end of the thirteenth century until around 1535.
They were "reports" in the literal sense of the word: They reported
speech that happened in the courtroom. All of them were written in
Law French, which was most likely the predominant oral language of
the profession at the time of the earliest Year Books." After spoken
court proceedings switched to English, reporting these cases would
have involved translating spoken English into written French.' 2
Below is an example of an anonymous case dating from 1319. It
is first presented in the original Law French. Each paragraph is then
followed by a translation into modern English. The names of lawyers
and judges were clearly well known to the writer and abbreviated in
the original:
Un Richard porta brief de dette vers un abb6 et soun com-
moygne, et dit qe le moygne taunt corn il fut seculer avoit apromt1
de ly x livres, a payer a certeynjour, a queljour il ne paya poynt; et
de ceo tendist sute saunz especialt6.
(One Richard brought a writ of debt against an abbot and a monk
of his house, and he said that the monk while yet secular had bor-
rowed from him ten pounds, to be paid back on a certain day, and
on that day the monk did not pay; and of this he tendered suit with-
out showing specialty.]
10 Hale mentions that the common law remained uniform because the judges
were few in number, sat near each other in Westminster Hall, and commonly dis-
cussed cases andjudgments. MATrHEw HALE, THE HisTORy AND ANALYSIS OF TH COM-
MON LAW OF ENGLAND 255-56 (photo. reprint 2000) (1713).
11 J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HIsTORY 179 (4th ed. 2002).
12 Id. at 178-86. On the languages in which early reports are written, see Paul
Brand, The Beginnings of English Law Reporting, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 1, 2
(Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995).
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Migg'. II demaunde ceste dette par resoun de un 
aprest fet au
moygne taunt corn il fut seculer, lequel homme 
est mort quaunt a la
ley de terre en taunt corn il est profs en religioun; 
et demaundoms
jugement si a tiel demoustraunce devez estre resceu.
[ Miggel. He demands this debt by reason of a loan 
made to the
monk while he was yet secular. Now that man 
is dead as regards the
law of the land, inasmuch as he has professed 
religious vows, so we
ask judgement whether you should be received to make 
such a
demonstrance.]
Scrop. Quant l'abb6 resceit un moygne il se deit aviser q'il 
ne seit
charg6 de dette, quar il ly deit resceyvre ove 
sa charge auxi corn le
baroun fra sa femme.
[Scrope. When the abbot receives a monk he 
must consider whether
he is not charged with debt, for he must receive 
him with his charge
just as a husband shall his wife.]
Here. Ceo n'est pas semblable, quar le moygne 
est mort quant a la
ley, et si n'est pas la femme.
[Her- That is a different matter, for the monk is dead 
at law and
the wife is not.]
Bert'. Pur ceo qe vous n'avez qe sute, a quei 
homme ne put alayer,
mes l'abbd ne put alayer le fet soun moygne, 
par quei agarde la
court qe vous ne prengnez rien par vostre 
brief.
[BEREFORD, C.J. Since you only tender suit which 
can involve no
wager of law, [since] the abbot cannot wage law upon 
the act of one
of his monks, the court awards that you take nothing 
by your writ.]
Et Toud et Frisk' disoyent qe cel jugement ust est6 mesq'il 
ust eu
fet; quar autrement ensuereit meschef, qe 
par fet de un seculer la
mesoun purra estre charg6 A touz jours. Set contra posissionem
potest fieri opinabilis questio etc.
[And Toudeby and Friskeney said the judgement would have 
been the
same even if the demandant had had a deed. 
Otherwise mischief
would have resulted, for the house [would] be charged 
for all time
by the deed of a secular. But against this position 
an arguable ques-
tion could be raised.]
13
Notice that the report focused as much-perhaps 
more-on the argu-
ments of the lawyers (Miggele, Scrope, and Herle) 
as on the state-
ments by the judges or the outcome.
The lawyers' mode of argument, and the 
judges' reaction, would
be familiar to any common law lawyer today. 
Miggele begins by argu-
ing that the debtor, now a monk, is 
considered legally dead, sug-
13 Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Hil. 39 (1319), reprinted in 70 SELDEN SOcIEv 
89 (1953)
(emphasis and footnote added).
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gesting that a dead person should not be liable for debts. Scrope
draws a different analogy, comparing the monk/abbot relationship to
that of husband and wife. Because a husband would have been bound
by his wife's premarital debts, the abbot should be bound by debts
incurred by the monk before he joined the religious community.
Herle then tries to distinguish these two cases by pointing out that a
married woman-unlike a monk-is not considered legally dead.
The judge, William de Bereford, ducks the issue on a procedural
ground. Two other judges suggest in dicta that the result might would
have been the same if the demandant had gotten the medieval
equivalent of a promissory note, but the reporter is skeptical.
This type of report was fairly typical for this time. To the extent
that they were indeed written by apprentices, the reports would have
concentrated on what the lawyers said and did, because this is what
they hoped to learn to emulate. Of course, the reaction of judges to
the pleadings and arguments of the lawyers was also important, but in
many of these early reports the actual decision-if reported at all-is
anti-climactic.14 The result, as Plucknett has pointed out, is that "use
of cases as sources of law" was "well-nigh impossible."15
A final observation is that the last sentence seems to be an inter-
jection (in Latin) by the reporter himself. Adding comments or
observations to a report, or including "off the record" comments by
lawyers and judges, remained common into relatively modern times. 16
Although the reports in the Year Books seem to have been made
largely for educational purposes, lawyers as early as the fourteenth
century were referring to cases that they believed might bolster their
arguments, and judges cited cases in response.17 It is important to
bear in mind that they were probably not referring to written judg-
ments, although sometimes they might have had a report of some sort
in their possession. Rather, they were referring to a decision that they
remembered or had heard about. Some judges seem to have had
remarkably clear memories of cases decided at least a decade before."I
They had no citation system, of course, but might refer to "David of
Fleetwick's case" or "the Bastard's Case," or they might just describe
some salient facts. Another judge or opposing counsel might attempt
to distinguish the case, perhaps by retorting non est simile (Latin for
"that is not the same") or n 'est pas semblable (Law French). We should
14 T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGL1SH LEGAL LITERATURE 102 (H.A. Holland ed.,
1958).
15 Id. at 104.
16 L.W. ABBOTr, LAw REPORTING IN ENGLAND 1485-1585, at 23-24 (1973).
17 CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 196 (7th ed. 1964).
18 Id.
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not exaggerate the amount of case citation, however. Citing cases,
especially by name, was hardly a routine practice in the way it is
today. 19
An innovation that began in the middle of the fifteenth century
indicates that lawyers were beginning to treat descriptions of court
proceedings not just as interesting or educational reports of what tran-
spired in court, but to some extent as sources of law. Specifically, law-
yers began compiling and printing "abridgments."20 Similar to
modern digests, the abridgments consisted of alphabetical headings,
like abatement or battery, followed by synopses of cases dealing with that
topic. This made it much more convenient for lawyers to find and cite
cases dealing with a particular legal proposition. 21 Such abridgments
strongly suggest that lawyers were beginning to view the common law
as a system of rules or principles that could be placed in distinct cate-
gories. And those rules could be found in reports of judicial
decisions.
Judges in the latter half of the fifteenth century were themselves
beginning to recognize the notion of precedent or stare decisis-that
once a legal issue is decided in a particular way, it ought to be decided
in the same way in future cases raising the same issue. For instance, a
judge observed in a 1496 case that "[o]ur decision in this case will be
shown hereafter as a precedent" and suggested that therefore they
should consider their judgment carefully.22
By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, therefore, it is possible
to speak of an emerging case law system. This still did not mean, how-
ever, that the cases necessarily had to be in writing. Reports could be
oral as well as written. Just as we can make an oral report of some
event today, lawyers of the time could orally report what happened in
court.2 3 And judges continued to have long memories. Sir James
Dyer, an Elizabethan judge, mentioned a "report of Baron Fortescue."
According to L.W. Abbott, this "report" must have consisted of passing
information by word of mouth, rather than by words on paper.24 On
another occasion, Dyer remarked: "Ask Catlyn, chief justice of
England, whether he was not overruled on this point-in that the
19 Id. at 196-200.
20 BAKER, supra note 11, at 184.
21 Id. at 184-86.
22 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 199 (citing Anon., Y.B. 11 Hen. 7, fol. 23a, at 10
(1496)).
23 Judges and lawyers were already citing cases during the Year Book period, but
typically relied on their memories, rather than citing to written reports. See JOHN
PHILIP DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 57 (1968).
24 ABBOTr, supra note 16, at 146.
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bond was void-in the time of Queen Mary when he was 
a serjeant,
and he will tell you that it was so."25 Sir John 
Spelman notes in a
proceeding from the sixteenth century that vn 
case fuit remember ("a
case was remembered") .26 Even today, an unreported case can 
func-
tion as precedent in England, as long as a barrister 
vouches for its
authenticity.
27
Yet while writing may not have been essential, it clearly 
had its
attractions. For example, even if members of the 
profession tried
their best to follow precedents, and to remember 
them, they would
most likely be able to recall no more than the 
general sense of what
the judge had decided in a previous case, rather than the 
precise
words that he spoke. There is a great deal of 
research showing that
typically we remember the gist of what people 
say, not their exact
words.2 8 As a result, an oral precedent is almost 
inevitably more vague
and flexible than written text.
Moreover, memory is fragile. In a system that is essentially 
oral,
older precedents will gradually fade from view. 
In fact, judges of this
era might sometimes conveniently have forgotten 
a precedent that
they preferred not to follow. Writing, even if 
not essential, provided
powerful evidence of what the judges had decided in an earlier 
case.
Dyer once expressed doubts about the authenticity 
of certain cases
because he had never seen references 
to them in any books.
29
Written reports addressed some of these problems. 
There were
many private compilations of cases before the invention 
of printing,
and some of these manuscripts appear to have 
been widely copied.30
At the same time, access to reports remained 
sporadic. Parchment
was dear and every copy had to be laboriously 
made by hand. Most
lawyers and judges would have had at best an eclectic sampling 
of
cases and no easy way to find those that were 
most relevant to any
particular point. Only the plea rolls, official records 
of the courts,
25 1 REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR 
JAMES DYER 118 (J.H. Baker ed.,
1994) [hereinafter DYER], reprinted in 109 SELDEN SOCIETY 
118 (1994).
26 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 196 
(J.H. Baker ed., 1977), reprinted in 73
SELDEN SOCIETY 196 (1977).
27 It appears that solicitors now also 
have this privilege. Guy HOUSORN, BUT-
TERWORTHS LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE 136 (2d ed. 2001).
28 SeeJacqueline Strunk Sachs, Recognition Memoiy 
for Syntactic and Semantic Aspects
of Connected Discourse, 2 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 437, 
442 (1967). For some legal
implications, see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN 
& PETER M. TIERSRA, SPEAFING OF CRIME
98-116 (2005).
29 DYER, supra note 25, at 76.
30 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 54-55.
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were anywhere near complete, but they were practically inaccessible to
the profession.3'
Equally important is that the accuracy and completeness of the
reports-which were almost always anonymous-would have been
highly uncertain. This would have been especially true if, as is often
thought, many of the early reports were made by what essentially were
apprentices or law students.52 Even if such apprentices correctly
understood what was happening, they reported primarily what was of
interest to them. Through accident or omission, many relevant details
might not appear in these reports at all. They were certainly not ver-
batim transcripts of what happened in court. On occasion, two
reports of a case gave exactly contrary decisions.33 As a result, even
lawyers and judges who had ready access to the case reports in the
Year Books and other sources would have been reluctant to rely on
them too heavily.
The arrival of printing in England greatly improved the accessi-
bility of case law. Printers quickly discovered that they had an audi-
ence in the legal profession. Reports of court proceedings became
widely available as a result. Still, the modern notion of precedent was
centuries away. This is indicated by the fact that the early printers,
despite publishing large amounts of legal materials, made virtually no
effort to print the most recent decisions. For example, several of the
Year Books were printed starting in 1481, but they contained cases that
were over two decades old. Cases from 1481 were not printed until
1520, around forty years later! In contrast, the printers often deliv-
ered statutes within a year of their enactment. It seems that while
statutes were being viewed as sources of law, cases were still consid-
ered largely educational, and not authoritative or binding in the sense
that they would later become.A4
Of course, as reports became more widely available, attitudes
began to change. This may have been due to some extent to the work
of one of the early legal printers, Richard Tottel. He published a ver-
sion of Fitzherbert's Abridgment that referred to Year Book cases. 35
He also reprinted some of those Year Books with cross-references to his
edition of Fitzherbert. 36 This made it vastly easier to find cases on a
31 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 201.
32 See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE
FIRST RALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 5 (Harold Dexter Hazeltine ed., 1922).
33 See id. at 3.
34 PLUGKNETr, supra note 14, at 111-12.
35 Id. at 112.
36 Id.
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particular point and no doubt facilitated their use by lawyers and
judges.
Relatedly, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
legal profession came to focus less on the arguments of counsel and
more on the decisions of judges. According to Holdsworth, the
center of interest shifted from the debate in court to the decision of the
court, a change that "led to the growth of the modern view as to the
authority of decided cases; and this, in turn, led to the growth of the
practice of constantly citing cases in court."37 Although the modern
conception of judicial decisions as authoritative or binding was still
developing, 38 they were increasingly regarded as potentially persuasive
and were thus of growing interest to the profession. The demand for
accurate published decisions likewise grew.39
Reports became more reliable with the advent of named report-
ers around 1550. 40 Some of them, like Edmund Plowden and James
Dyer, were eminent jurists. 41 Nonetheless, both Plowden and Dyer
made their reports for their own use and neither intended them to be
published. Plowden did ultimately decide to have his reports printed,
but his main motive seems to have been to prevent the issuance of a
pirated edition of his work.42 A selection of Dyer's reports was pub-
lished only after he died.43
Another prominent reporter of this period was Edward Coke,
whose first volumes of reports were printed in the early years of the
seventeenth century. 44 Coke's reports were highly regarded by his
contemporaries. Through them he tried to bring order and logic to
the law. Coke therefore concentrated less on the speeches of counsel
and more on the judgments or opinions from the bench, regarding
the judges as lex loquens, or "speaking law."45 And he tried to report
cases that were particularly important from a legal perspective. 46 In
fact, his efforts to systematize the law by means of his reports may have
been Coke's greatest weakness, for he was sometimes accused of sub-
37 5 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 372 (7th ed.
1972).
38 See THEODORE F.T. PLucKNE-rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 346
(5th ed. 1956).
39 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 371-72.
40 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 65-66.
41 Id., supra note 23, at 65-67.
42 David Ibbetson, Law Reporting in the 1590s, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN, SUpra
note 12, at 73, 80-81.
43 Id.
44 ABBOTrF, supra note 16, at 249 & n.39.
45 Id. at 251.
46 Id. at 251-52.
2007] 1199
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
stituting his own opinion for that of a court with which he disagreed.47
As Plucknett remarked, a case in Coke's reports "is an uncertain
mingling of genuine report, commentary, criticism, elementary
instruction, and recondite legal history."48
Particularly interesting from our perspective is that Coke
intended his reports to be printed and designed them to be used by
legal practitioners. 49 In this sense he may have been ahead of his
time. Whatever failings Coke's reports might have had from a mod-
ern point of view, his efforts show that the legal profession was begin-
ning to value relatively contemporaneous and accurate reports as a
source of decisions that could function as precedents.
Although counsel could refer to any previous case to support an
argument in court, even if not reported at all, or if reported only in
manuscript form, lawyers no doubt believed that referring to a series
of printed reports would be to their advantage. Indeed, Ibbetson's
examination of the arguments of lawyers shows that as early as the
1590s, lawyers were showing a marked preference for printed reports
over remembered decisions or manuscript reports.50 This was true
even though the printed cases were often quite old, and even though
more recent and more relevant cases were available in manuscript
form.
The practices of reporters who followed in the footsteps of such
luminaries as Plowden and Coke left much to be desired. During the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the quality ofjudicial decisions
fluctuated wildly. Reporting remained a private enterprise, and the
results depended on the interest and care of the individual reporters
and printers, whose main motive was usually to make as much money
as possible. 5 Most of those reporters were hardly the cream of the
profession.
Some judges of the time became concerned that their reputa-
tions would be injured by the poor quality of the reporting. An exas-
perated ChiefJustice Holt once remarked: "See the inconveniences of
these scrambling reports: they will make us appear to posterity for a
parcel of blockheads." 52 More serious, of course, was that in a system
with growing reliance on precedent, inaccurate reports of previous
decisions were highly problematic. Judges characterized some reports
47 See JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE REPORTERS ARRANGED AND CHARACTERIZED
WITH INCIDENTAL REmRss 172-75 (4th ed., Boston, Soule & Bugbee 1882).
48 PLUCKNETT, supra note 38, at 281.
49 ABBOTT, supra note 16, at 247-48; Ibbetson, supra note 42, at 81.
50 Ibbetson, supra note 42, at 84-85.
51 See ROBERT MEGARRY, A SECOND MISCELLANY-AT-LAw 117-33 (1973).
52 Id. at 120 (quoting Slater v. May, (1704) 92 Eng. Rep. 210 (K.B.)).
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from this time as being of "questionable authority"53 or even "totally
mistaken."5 4 Another judge said of a reporter that he heard only half
of what went on in court and that he reported the other half.55
Siderfin's reports were deemed "fit to be burned."56 Justice Park went
a step further, actually burning his copy of Keble's reports.5 7 Even
eminent lawyers were not immune from criticism. Lord Mansfield
claimed that Blackstone's reports were not very accurate. 5  Conse-
quently, whether to follow a precedent to a large extent depended on
the reputation of the reporter and the quality of the report, leaving
judges "at liberty to attach different degrees of weight to different
authorities. '" 5 9
Moreover, it was the reporters and printers, rather than judges,
who had control over what was published and what was not. A rather
extreme example is that one reporter, Lord Campbell, is said to have
censored his reports by refusing to include any case that he deemed
improperly decided. 60 Campbell also strove to improve his reports by
correcting the "blunders" of the judge.61
A further problem was that there were no official reporters and
few impediments on private individuals who wished to enter the busi-
ness. As a result, there could be, and often were, multiple reports of a
single case, none of which were complete verbatim records of what
had transpired.6 2 Instead, they summarized the proceedings with
varying degrees of fidelity and completeness. Sir James Burrow, who
reported around the middle of the eighteenth century and whose
efforts are generally well regarded, noted that he did not take down
arguments and judgments verbatim, because he did not write short-
hand, but he tried to convey the sense as well as possible in his own
53 Id. at 119 (quoting Cholmondeley v. Clinton, (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 527 (K.B.)).
54 Id. (quoting The King v. Harris, (1797) 101 Eng. Rep. 952,952 (KB.)); see also
W.H. Bryson, Law Reports in England from 1603 to 1660, in LAw REPORTING IN BRIrAN,
supra note 12, at 113, 115 ("In consideration of these observations, one should not be
surprised at the poor quality of the reports of this era.")
55 GLANVILLE WILLIAMs, LEARNINc THE LAW 37 (A.T.H. Smith ed., 13th ed. Sweet
& Maxwell 2006) (1945) (citing 54 L.Q.R. 368).
56 WALLArCE, supra note 47, at 295 (citing 1 Shower 252).
57 Id. at 315.
58 MEGARRY, supra note 51, at 125 (citing Devon v. Watts, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 59,
64 (KB.)). In Blackstone's defense, his reports were published posthumously by his
executor, who was apparently not a lawyer. WALLACE, supra note 47, at 443-44.
59 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 222.
60 MEGARRY, supra note 51, at 131-32 (citing 5 Camp. L. CC. 376).
61 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 231.
62 Erwin C. Surrency, Law Reports in the United States, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 48, 50
(1981).
2007 ]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
words.63 Reports of the same case by his competitors would inevitably
have been somewhat different.
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, publishers reduced
the time lag to publication. At the same time, the quality of the
reports remained an issue. Reliance on precedents would be prob-
lematic as long as reporting was an inexact science. Lord Mansfield is
said to have disregarded what he considered to be poorly reported
decisions. 64 And Sir Frederick Pollock pointed out that a report can
always be contradicted by a more accurate report, "or even by the
clear recollection of the Court or counsel."65 Obviously, the common
law of this time, though it was increasingly found in written docu-
ments, nonetheless remained largely "unwritten" in the sense of Hale.
As a consequence, the common law remained conceptually dis-
tinct from statutory law. What mattered was the court's decision and
the general principle that underlay it, and not the precise words in
which the decision was expressed. As Mansfield said: "The law does
not consist of particular cases, but of general principles, which are
illustrated and explained by these cases." 66 Mansfield also noted that
"[t]he reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular
precedents. '67 Likewise, Pollock observed:
Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that
judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the princi-
ples recognized and applied as necessary grounds for the decision.
Therefore it has never been possible for the courts to impose dog-
matic formulas on the Common Law, and the efforts of text-writers
to bind it in fetters of verbal definition have been constantly and for
the most part happily frustrated .... 68
There was also a purely practical factor that discouraged the pro-
fession from relying too much on the exact words or text of a deci-
sion. Not only were there different reports of any one case, but most
courts of the time had multiple judges, each of whom would, in
sequence, express his own opinion regarding how he would dispose of
63 Id.
64 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 154.
65 FREDERICK POLLOCK, EssAYs IN THE LAW 233 (1922).
66 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 217 (quoting The King v. Bembridge, (1783) 99 Eng.
Rep. 679, 681 (K.B.)).
67 C.G. MORAN, THE HERALDS OF THE LAW 88 (1948) (quoting Fisher v. Prince,
(1762) 99 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B.)).
68 Frederick Pollock, Introduction to JOHN HENRY WIGMORE ET AL., PROGRESS OF
CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, at xli, xliv (1918).
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the case and why.69 These are known as seriatim opinions. It would
be foolish to take one judge's words and to elevate them over the
words of a colleague who agreed with the result but for a different
reason. The best that a lawyer could do is to try to extract from these
opinions what the judges in the majority seem to have felt was the
principle that guided their decision.
Of course, even if the lawyers and judges eschewed "exact words"
and "dogmatic formulas," they were nonetheless concerned that
reports be an accurate reflection of what had transpired. One step in
this direction was to appoint authorized or official reporters. In 1865
the English bar set up its own reporting system, run by the Incorpo-
rated Council of Law Reporting. 70 This Council issues its own series
of reports: the Law Reports, which have come to be treated as semi-
official and should be cited in court when possible.7' Private reports
continue to exist, however. 72
The growing importance of case reports as a source of law is also
shown by the fact that, over the course of the nineteenth century,
reporters began to reduce the space allotted to the arguments of law-
yers. By the end of the century, some reporters began to omit the
arguments of lawyers altogether. 73 As a result, reports were no longer
summaries or descriptions of the verbal interplay between advocates
and judges, as they were originally, but focused almost entirely on the
judgment or opinion of the judges.
Since the reforms in the nineteenth century, English reports-
particularly the Law Reports-are felt to have achieved a high degree
of accuracy.74 This is enhanced by the fact that judges now usually
read and approve the text of their decisions before they appear in the
Law Reports.75 Other reports, like the All England Law Reports, are not
normally screened by the judges. Interestingly, the lack of editing by
judges is sometimes felt to be a virtue. There are apparently practi-
tioners who prefer the private reporters because they are closer to
69 Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History offudicial Disin-
tegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 189-91 (1959).
70 SUZANNE WARREN ET AL., LEGAL RESEARCH IN ENGLAND AND WALES 14 (rev. ed.
1996).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 15.
73 In England, the Weekly Law Reports do not usually contain argument of counsel.
The same is true of the All England Law Reports. On the other hand, the Law Reports
do often contain argument. Id.
74 MiCrHAL ZANDER, THE LAw-MA1ING PROCESS 312 (6th ed. Cambridge Univ.
Press 2004) (1980) (quoting REPORT OF THE LAW REPORTING COMMITTEE (1940)).
75 Judges have to some extent been reading draft reports of their decisions since
the end of the eighteenth century. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 38, at 281.
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what the judge actually said, rather than what the judge, on reflection,
would have liked to have said.76 They are, in other words, more accu-
rate reports of what actually happened.
It remains true in England that the same case can be reported in
different ways. Although the differences are not nearly as extreme as
they sometimes were in the past, they can be substantial, not just
because the judges edit some reports (and not others), but especially
because some reporters give more detail, while others present a sum-
mary.77 In addition, reports are edited by professional editors before
publication, which can compound the differences among reports of
the same case. 78 Especially with reports of extemporaneous (oral)
decisions, "published reports sometimes bear little resemblance to the
judgments ... upon which they are based."7 9
The House of Lords further elevated the significance of the writ-
ten word when it abandoned the oral delivery of its judgments in
1963.80 The law lords now draft their judgments after argument and
provide them to reporters in written form. This seems to guarantee
that there will no longer be differing reports of a case. All the
reporter has to do is pick up the judgments, perhaps add some head-
notes and a summary, and print the result. Judges on the Court of
Appeal may also write out their opinions in some of the more impor-
tant or difficult cases that come before them. But they still deliver
many oral judgments, often directly after argument, which may or
may not be reported.
B. Precedent Tightens its Grip
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and much of the
twentieth, English appellate courts not only came to view precedent as
an important source of law that should not be changed without good
reason, but they went so far as to refuse to change their own prece-
dents, even when they were felt to be wrong."' As J.H. Baker has
observed, the duty of "repeating errors" is a modern innovation and
may have resulted from the improved quality of law reports following
developments in shorthand techniques, "which made the ipsissima
76 ZANDER, supra note 74, at 312.
77 Proposals to have shorthand writers take down the exact text of every judg-
ment have been rejected. Id. at 312.
78 See MORAN, supra note 67, at 47-48, 100.
79 DELMAR KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 104
(1963).
80 Practice Direction, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1382 (H.L.).
81 See DAWSON, supra note 23, at 91-94. The pivotal case was London Street Tram-
ways Co. v. London County Counci [1898] A.C. 375, 378 (H.L.).
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verba of the judges available as an authentic text and made bold distin-
guishing more difficult." 2
Precedent had long been a feature of judicial reasoning, of
course, but during much of the twentieth century it held English
courts in a tighter grip than before. Previously, judges had followed
precedent if there were several cases on a point that all reached the
same conclusion, or if the courts deciding a case were particularly
eminent, or perhaps if they believed that the profession had come to
rely on a case. But by the first part of the twentieth century, a single
relevant precedent was felt to be absolutely binding. 3
A well-known example is Beamish v. Beamish,84 in which Lord
Campbell made the following point about a precedential case that he
felt to be on point, but with which he disagreed:
If it were competent to me, I would now ask your Lordships to
reconsider the doctrine laid down in R. v. Millis, particularly as the
judges who were then consulted complained of being hurried into
giving an opinion without due time for deliberation ....
But it is my duty to say that your Lordships are bound by this deci-
sion ... and that the rule of law which your Lordships lay down as
the ground of your judgment ... must be taken for law till altered
by an Act of Parliament . . . . The law laid down as your ratio
decidendi, [is] clearly binding on all inferior tribunals, and . . . if it
were not considered as equally binding upon your Lordships, this
House would be arrogating to itself the right of altering the law, and
legislating by its own separate authority. 5
The House of Lords unshackled itself by means of a Practice
Statement in 1966 that declared that it would henceforth feel free to
disregard an earlier opinion "when it appears right to do so. ''s6 None-
theless, according to a study published roughly fifteen years later, the
lords have exercised their new-found liberty quite sparingly. They
have held, for instance, that they will not overrule a previous decision
82 BAKER, supra note 11, at 200. Also see DAWSON, supra note 23, at 80, who
points out that "theories of precedent could not be strict until reports became relia-
ble," which was around 1800.
83 Steve Hedley, Words, Words, Words: Making Sense of LegalJudgments, 1875-1940,
in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN, supra note 12, at 169, 171-72.
84 (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 735 (H.L), quoted in RUPERT CROSS &J.W. HARRIS, PRECE-
DENT IN ENGLISH LAW 8 (4th ed. 1991).
85 Id. at 760-61.
86 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 94; see also CRoss & FAnIS, supra note 84, at 104-08
(discussing the constitutional basis for the change).
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just because they believe that it was wrongly decided, but that there
has to be some additional basis for refusing to follow it.8 7
Lower English courts continue to be bound by precedent; the
freedom to overrule earlier decisions granted by the Practice State-
ment to the House of Lords quite pointedly does not apply to them,
and the lords have quashed attempts by some justices on the Court of
Appeal to have the rule extended. 88 This aspect of precedent-feel-
ing oneself bound, or at least, strongly encouraged, to follow one's
earlier decisions-is often called stare decisis.
There is a second way in which courts are bound by precedent:
Lower courts must also follow precedents established by a higher
court. Unlike stare decisis, which is basically a self-imposed restric-
tion, this aspect of precedent is generally felt to be mandatory in the
common law system. For example, in Miliangos v. George Frank (Tex-
tiles) Ltd.,8 9 Lord Wilberforce of the House of Lords criticized the
Court of Appeal for failing to follow a precedent (In re United Railways
of the Havana Regla Warehouse Ltd.90) that had previously been estab-
lished by the lords. But Wilberforce, relying on the 1966 Practice
Statement, then suggested that the House should "depart from" the
precedent itself.91 Lord Fraser of Tullybelton agreed that the House
should "decline to follow" the Havana Railways case.92 Lord Simon of
Glaisdale dissented, arguing that Havana Railways should not be over-
ruled, and also suggesting that "it is better to avoid euphemisms like
'departed from"' and face the facts: the House had "overruled" a pre-
vious precedent.93 The case illustrates quite nicely how seriously pre-
cedent is still taken in England.
Of course, the hierarchical aspect of precedent requires that
there be a system where a superior court has the power to overrule a
lower court for failing to follow one of the higher court's earlier deci-
sions. The hierarchy of English courts, with the House of Lords on
the top, was not clearly established until 1876, which is another reason
that the binding nature of precedent reached its pinnacle in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Moreover, the House of
Lords did not allow the systematic reporting of its decisions until
roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, making it difficult to
87 ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 154-69 (1982).
88 CROSS & HARIS, supra note 84, at 108-09.
89 [1976] A.C. 443 (H.L.).
90 [1960] Ch. 52, 52 (C.A.).
91 Miliangos, [1976] A.C. at 470.
92 Id. at 501.
93 Id. at 471.
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discern the rationales for its judgments and apply them to other
cases.
94
Thus, throughout most of the history of England, the reports of
judgments were exactly that: reports of what the judges said. The rule
of law, or holding, depended not so much on what was written in the
reports, but on how the case was decided. A 1940 report of a commit-
tee established by the Lord Chancellor to study reporting practices
observed that "the law of England is what it is, not because it has been
so reported, but because it has been so decided."95 Or consider the
words of an Australian judge remarking on another case in 1971:
"[M] ere infelicities of expression or slips of the tongue have no effect.
Some latitude of construction should be applied, particularly to an
extempore judgment. It is the reasoning of the court not its mode of
expression, which is under appeal . . ."96 Case law was not really
unwritten, of course. But it clearly was-and in England still is-more
conceptual than verbal.
The fact that in England the common law has remained unwrit-
ten in a certain sense-that it is something to be extracted from the
decisions ofjudges rather than ascertained by close reading of the text
of a judge's opinion-may help explain why it is possible for the
courts to believe themselves absolutely bound by their own previous
decisions. In such a rigid system there has to be an escape valve. It
turns out that English judges and lawyers have several ways to avoid
the force of a precedent, many of which are aided by the vestiges of
orality in the English system.
For instance, because the judges normally do not lay out their
holding by an authoritative formulation, leaving it up to later judges
and lawyers to figure out the holding by means of deduction, it is
always possible to recharacterize the ratio decidendi retrospectively,
or to broaden or narrow its reach. As Carleton Kemp Allen has
remarked, the ratio decidendi is "in a constant state of flux." 97 Subtle
reconceptualization of a case's holding is facilitated by the fact that
the reports of judgments are often not written by the judges them-
selves, and that there are sometimes multiple reports of a case, mak-
ing reliance on the exact words of an opinion inherently risky.
What also gives English judges some freedom of movement is that
it is still common to issue multiple or seriatim opinions, where all the
94 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 220.
95 MORAN, supra note 67, at 95 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S
COMMITTEE (1940)).
96 Churchill v. Badenochs Transp. Ld., [1971] 1 S.A. St. R. 63, 64-65.
97 ALLEN, supra note 17, at 260.
20071 t 20 7
[VOL. 82:3
1208 NOIRE iAM- I .......
judges state their opinion, usually in order of seniority. This remains
the prevailing practice in the English courts of appeal. 
As mentioned,
the law lords now write their opinions instead 
of delivering them
orally, but they continue to sound very much like speeches, 
and multi-
ple judgments are common. As of the 1980s, all five law lords 
on a
panel delivered a separate opinion in thirty-five 
percent of its cases.98
Single dispositive opinions, in which the remaining 
lords concur with-
out elaboration, are relatively rare.
99 Clearly, multiple opinions tend
to make the determination of a holding more 
difficult. And, of
course, they give lower court judges, as well as the lords themselves 
in
later cases, a fair amount of freedom in how 
to characterize the
holding.
Finally, English courts are bound only by the ratio 
decidendi of
an earlier case on the same issue. They are not 
obligated to follow
obiter dicta, or comments that are not directly on 
point. It is easy to
see how a distinction between ratio and dicta would 
arise in a system
where a reporter decides which of a judge's oral comments to 
memo-
rialize for posterity. When speaking, people often 
say things that are
not directly relevant. Writing, on the other hand, 
is generally planned
and organized in advance. Irrelevancies and digressions, 
especially in
formal styles of writing, tend to be frowned upon. 
Dismissing as dicta
something that an esteemed judge has thought about and has person-
ally reduced to writing is much more difficult 
than when the same
thought occurs in an oral opinion delivered right 
after lawyers finish
their argument.
The English legal system itself distinguishes between 
an extem-
pore judgment, one that is delivered orally directly after argument,
and a reserved judgment, where the judges have taken some 
time to
think the matter over and deliver their judgments several weeks 
or
even months later.100 A reserved judgment is not inevitably written, 
in
contrast to an extempore judgment, which is necessarily delivered
orally. But it appears to be normal practice to 
deliver reserved judg-
ments in writing. In any event, a reserved judgment is felt to 
have
greater weight than one delivered extempore because 
the judges had
time to consider the matter.
10
'
98 PATERSON, supra note 87, at 110.
99 Id. at 110-11.
100 The fact that judgment was reserved is usually indicated 
in the reports by the
annotation cur adv vult (for curia advisari vult).
101 WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 117. It is not clear 
that this is still as true as it once
was. It seems that nowadays, judges who deliver an extempore judgment 
may later be
giving a written copy to the reporters for publication. 
See Cas. v. Hugh James, [2000] 1
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Thus, at a time when English common law was truly lex non
scripta, rigid reliance on earlier decisions would have been unlikely to
develop. Even after court proceedings came to be written down by
reporters, it was possible for eminent lawyers like Francis Bacon, Mat-
thew Hale, and William Blackstone to maintain that there was a funda-
mental distinction between the written law produced by Parliament
and the unwritten law ofjudges. As written reports became ever more
accessible and accurate, a more vigorous doctrine of precedent could
and did develop. Oddly enough, however, the rigidity of English pre-
cedent during especially the twentieth century was to a large extent
made possible by the fact that English law still maintained, in some
important respects, vestiges of its oral past. In fact, the English com-
mon law remains remarkably oral, as we see in the fact that preceden-
tial value is still ascribed to extempore opinions. Even when decisions
are written down by judges in their own words, there are still signifi-
cant vestiges of the common law's original orality.
C. Residual Orality in Modern England
Although English judgments are becoming more written, there is
still much evidence of orality. One reason, of course, is that many
appellate judgments are still delivered by word of mouth. But even
those judges, such as the law lords, who write their opinions, circulate
them to be read by their colleagues, and then hand them out to
reporters to be printed verbatim, are still to some extent operating in
an oral mode. Their written opinions contain a fair amount of what
linguists sometimes call oral residue-vestiges of oral traditions that
have only recently started to die out, and which retain a surprising
amount of vitality even today. 0 2
The most obvious examples are the oral judgments given by
English appellate courts. There are not a huge number of extempore
judgments in the modern English reports. In most decisions that
raise a novel question of law, and which are likely to be reported,
judges will probably wish to take some time to consider the matter and
then issue a written opinion. Nonetheless, a surprising number of
oral decisions, many by the Court of Appeal, can be found in the
reports, and many more are delivered without being reported. Such
All E.R. 289 (C.A.), which by all indications is an extempore judgment, but which is
reported in [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1278 in essentially identical terms.
102 See, e.g., Walter J. Ong, Oral Residue in Tudor Prose Style, 80 PUBLICATIONS MOD.
LANGUAGE ASS'N OF AM. 145, 146 (1965) (defining "oral residue" as "habits of thought
and expression tracing back to preliterate situations or practice, or deriving from the
dominance of the oral as a medium in a given culture").
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decisions tend to be relatively short and typically involve 
the consider-
ation of a limited number of issues.
As one would expect, judges who deliver oral opinions usually
refer to themselves as "I," even when they are part 
of a majority, since
technically they can only speak for themselves. Because 
they have just
heard argument by the parties' lawyers, whom they 
might very well
know personally, it is not surprising that they often 
refer to the advo-
cates by name. As is common in speech, and usually 
less acceptable in
formal written modes of communication, judges might also express
their emotions. LordJustice Buxton had this to say 
about lawyers who
failed to find and cite a relevant precedent:
I cannot draw back from expressing my very great concern 
that the
judge was permitted by those professional advocates to approach
the matter as if it were free from authority when there 
was a recently
reported case in this court directly on the point 
.... It is not only
extremely discourteous to the judge not to inform him properly
about the law, but it has also been extremely wasteful 
of time and
money in this case .... I have, I fear, to say that 
the advocates who
appeared below did not discharge their duty properly 
to the
court .... 103
In another judgment from the Court of Appeal the judge
remarked: "I pause at this point to say that I find 
it most surprising
that a letter of that kind was not copied to Mrs. Aparau 
or those advis-
ing her."104
Also consistent with what one would expect in the 
report of an
oral decision is that there are no footnotes. Moreover, 
headings or
divisions into sections are rare in extempore opinions, 
and if they
exist are apparently inserted afterwards by a reporter 
or editor, or per-
haps by the judge himself.
The Court of Appeal now sometimes delivers 
opinions of the
court, but they are almost invariably written opinions 
in cases where
judgment was reserved. In such cases, the use of we is almost 
obliga-
tory, and the tentativeness of the seriatim opinions 
disappears. One
such opinion eschews the standard reference 
to what the judges
"would" do and boldly ends with the words: "We have therefore come
to the conclusion that there is no basis for suspecting 
that any of the
convictions for murder is unsafe. The appeals 
are accordingly
dismissed." 1
0 5
103 Copeland v. Smith, [20001 1 All E.R. 457, 459 (C.A.).
104 Aparau v. Iceland Frozen Foods Plc, [20003 1 All E.R. 
228, 233 (C.A.).
105 R. v. Boreman, .[20001 1 All E.R. 307, 319 (C.A.).
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In the highest English court, the House of Lords, opinions have
now been produced in writing for several decades.' 0 6 After hearing
argument, the lords confer among themselves. If they all agree on the
outcome, they may assign one of their number to draft an opinion
which is circulated among members of the panel, who can then either
concur or write an opinion of their own. If there is no initial consen-
sus, several or all of the lords may write a separate judgment. 0' 7 What
is interesting is that despite the transition to written opinions, cases
are still presented in the reports as though they had been delivered
orally. Each of the law lords hearing the case produces a separate
opinion, in order of seniority. Often enough, the opinion is quite
brief, and says nothing more than "My Lords, I have had the advan-
tage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend
Lord Hope of Craighead. For the reasons he has given I would dis-
miss the appeal." 10 8
Another indication of residual orality is that the lords do not hesi-
tate to use the pronouns I or my, even though their use is generally
discouraged in formal writing. In contrast, Justice Stephen Breyer
recently caused a bit of a scandal by his use of the pronoun "I" in his
draft opinion for the United States Supreme Court. To be exact, he
wrote that "I will call" a certain decision "case two."' 0 9 The result was
a "legal frenzy" that motivated at least one law professor to send a note
of complaint to the justice for his "nonstandard" usage. 110 When the
opinion appeared in final form, the "I" was nowhere to be found."'
The fact that House of Lords opinions still appear seriatim in the
reports, even though they are not really "delivered" nowadays, harks
back to an earlier period when the judgments were, in fact, pro-
nounced orally one after the other. According to Alan Paterson, who
has studied and interviewed the law lords, there was some feeling
among the lords that multiple opinions can be problematic, especially
if they overlap, but there is no formal mechanism for dealing with the
issue.112 Most judges felt that it was good to have a single substantive
opinion in criminal appeals, especially those that involve statutory
106 Cf. PATERSON, supra note 87, at 10 (noting that speeches have not been read
out since 1963).
107 Id. at 92-96.
108 Coventry & Solihull Waste Disposal Co. v. Russell, [20001 1 All E.R. 97, 99
(H.L.).
109 S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 119 S. Ct. 1180, 1185 (1999).
110 Tony Mauro, Justice's Supreme Use of "I" Sparks a Legal Frenzy, USA ToDAY, Apr. 2,
1999, at IlA.
111 526 U.S. 160, 167 (1999) (replacing "I" with "we").
112 PATERSON, supra note 87, at 97.
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construction." 51 In difficult common law cases, on the other hand,
they favored multiple opinions. 1 4 The main reason for the difference
is probably that there is a greater need for certainty in the criminal
law. In contrast, multiple opinions in common law cases, as discussed
above, are one of the mechanisms by which the law can retain some
flexibility in light of the coercive nature of precedent in the English
system.
There are additional vestiges of orality in judgments from the
House of Lords. For example, they tend to be somewhat less formal
in tone than opinions of the United States Supreme Court, which is
roughly comparable in standing. Formal language, of course, is com-
mon in writing, while speech is generally less formal. In addition, the
opinions sometimes suggest face-to-face contact with other judges or
with an audience, in contrast to the impersonal tone of most Ameri-
can Supreme Court opinions. For instance, the lords begin each
opinion with the phrase "My Lords," as though they were speaking to
a live audience. And they often refer by name to a specific barrister
who argued the case, as did Lord Goff of Chieveley: "I was at first
impressed by Sir Patrick's argument, particularly as developed by him
in his reply. But on reflection I find myself unable to accept it.'"" 1 5
Lord Goffs statement reveals another way in which English prac-
tice remains relatively oral: Argument before the appellate courts is
not subject to strict time limits, and the judges typically engage in
extended verbal interaction with the lawyers. In one Court of Appeal
case, the argument seems to have gone on for three weeks. 1 6 This
applies also to the House of Lords, where according to Paterson's
study the lords base their decisions primarily on oral argument, as
opposed to written submissions.' 17 In the United States, on the other
hand, appellate judges rely far more on written briefing and usually
impose strict time limits on oral argument, typically half an hour per
side. Sometimes they refuse to allow oral argument at all.' 1 8
The primary reason for the much longer oral argument in
English appellate cases is that English barristers do not provide the
exhaustive briefs that American lawyers do. Consequently, judges nor-
mally do not research a case beforehand (unlike American practice,
113 Id. at 98.
114 Id.
115 Scher v. Policyholders Prot. Bd., [1994] 2 A.C. 57, 101 (H.L.).
116 In re United Rys. of the Havana & Regla Warehouses Ltd., [1960] Ch. 52, 52
(C.A.).
117 PATERSON, supra note 87, at 35-36.
118 See KARLEN, supra note 79, at 19 (referring to practice before the New York
Appellate Division).
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where judges and their clerks have studied the briefs, usually done
additional research, and often reached a tentative decision before any
argument takes place). As opposed to American judges, who typically
read important precedents and have time to study their exact wording,
English lawyers normally hear about them during argument."19
Although they presumably receive a copy of important cases from
counsel, they normally do not have time to study the wording of a case
in the way that an American judge can. And because there is relatively
little case law in England, as well as the fact that bench and bar tend
to be specialized, the judge may already know what the law is, making
lengthy citation to precedents unnecessary.
Further evidence of oral residue is that the law lords, despite hav-
ing written their opinions for decades, refer to them as "speeches."
Likewise, they typically remark on what a judge "said" in a previous
case, rather than what he "wrote." And they admit to emotions, some-
thing considerably more common in spoken interaction than it is in
formal written texts. As one of the law lords once said: "My Lords, I
must own that this question has caused me considerable anxiety."120
Such statements are relatively unusual in an American Supreme Court
opinion, certainly when the judge is part of the majority, as opposed
to a dissenter.
A final indication that English appellate practice is still relatively
oral is that courts will recognize unreported cases as precedents, as
long as a barrister vouches for their authenticity. 12 As a reaction to
the increasing number of unreported decisions that are now available
online, citing to such cases before the lords requires first obtaining
their leave, and other English courts also tend to discourage it.122 But
the mere fact that it is possible to rely on an unreported precedent
indicates that Matthew Hale's view of the common law as lex non
scripta retains remarkable vitality. 123
So far the discussion may have seemed mostly of interest to legal
historians or perhaps students of law and literature. I believe, how-
ever, that it has much broader implications than might at first appear.
The essentially oral nature of English case law has led to a conception
of precedent that differs markedly from that in the United States. To
119 Id. at 93-94.
120 R. v. Preston, (19941 2 A.C. 130, 169 (H.L.).
121 15 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 248.
122 ZANDER, supra note 74, at 321.
123 See KAnLEN, supra note 79, at 89. Karlen concludes from this fact that "the
common law of England is far more truly 'unwritten' than the common law of the
United States." Id.
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appreciate this difference, we must examine a bit more closely the
English understanding of precedent.
D. Finding the Ratio
When English judges say that they are bound to follow a prece-
dent, they do not mean that an earlier case must be followed in all
particulars. One of the basic justifications for a legal regime based on
precedent is that like cases should be decided alike. Thus, the first
inquiry is necessarily whether the case to be decided has similar facts
or raises roughly the same issue as a case that is a potential precedent.
If the earlier case can be distinguished from the one at bar, it is not a
"like" case, and judges deciding the later case need not follow it.
Although any preceding case is a precedent in the broadest sense, I
will assume for present purposes that a precedent is only a case that is
sufficiently similar that judges agree that it provides some or all of the
rule or reasoning needed to decide the case in question.
Even if we decide that a previous case should serve as a precedent
in this sense, it does not follow that everything the judge said in the
earlier judgment, or even every legal principle that he or she articu-
lated, is binding on the later court. Judicial decisions are very differ-
ent from statutes in this regard. A general rule for interpreting
statutes is that every word has meaning and that nothing should be
treated as surplusage.1 24 This canon does not apply to judicial opin-
ions, where lawyers and judges draw careful distinctions between rules
or principles that are essential to the outcome (called the ratio
decidendi or simply the ratio) and those that are not (called obiter
dicta, orjust obiter, or simply dicta). Obiter dictum translates approx-
imately as "something said by the way" or "an aside." The received
view is that while dicta may have some degree of persuasive force,
often depending on which judge or court made the statements, they
are not part of the precedent that must be followed. Consequently,
one way to avoid the binding force of a rule or principle stated in a
preceding case is to classify it as dictum. Particularly in England,
where precedent is more difficult to sidestep than in the United
States, lawyers and judges often debate whether a statement made in a
previous case is or is not obiter dictum. As a judge in the Chancery
Division recently mentioned, after quoting at length from an earlier
case: "The final sentence provides support for Mr. Higginson's argu-
ment. But as Mr. Howe pointed out, the final sentence is
obiter . "... ,,25
124 See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 64 (1999).
125 Memory Corp. v. Sidhu, [2000] 1 All E.R. 434, 447 (Ch.).
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Closely related is the problem of determining exactly what the
ratio decidendi is. Cross and Harris provide a working definition of
the term's meaning: "The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law
expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in
reaching his conclusion .... ,126 Unfortunately, finding the ratio,
though it is one of the most basic skills of a lawyer, can be an uncer-
tain enterprise fraught with difficulty. Cross and Harris discuss the
various approaches or methodologies proposed by legal scholars such
as Wambaugh, Halsbury, and Goodhart, 127 but end up concluding
that it is "impossible to devise formulae for determining the ratio
decidendi of a case." 128 Nonetheless, according to Lord Reid of the
House of Lords: "It matters not how difficult it is to find the ratio
decidendi of a previous case, that ratio must be found."1 9
Traditionally, finding the ratio has required close analysis of the
facts and outcome of a case. In theory, it is possible to determine the
holding of a case even when no reasons are given for a decision.' 30
An example is the famous Peerless case, decided in 1864 and more
precisely entitled Raffles v. Wichelhaus.' 31 The plaintiff made a con-
tract to sell 125 bales of Indian cotton at a specified price, to arrive
from Bombay on the ship named Peerless.132 It turned out that there
were at least two ships by that name, one leaving Bombay in October
and the other in December. 33 The defendant buyers refused to
accept the cotton. The report of the case, which consists of about one
printed page, begins with a summary of the pleadings. It continues
with the argument by counsel for the plaintiff seller, who is continu-
ously interrupted by the obviously skeptical judges. The lawyer for the
defendants then starts his argument by suggesting that there was evi-
dence that the plaintiff meant one Peerless and the defendants
intended to refer to a different Peerless.'34 As a result, there was "no
consen[s]us ad idem, and therefore no binding contract."13 5 Accord-
ing to the reporter, the lawyer "was then stopped by the Court."' 36
With no discussion or elaboration, the judges abruptly declare: "There
126 CRoss & HAuRIs, supra note 84, at 72.
127 Id. at 52-71.
128 Id. at 72.
129 Nash v. Tamplin & Sons Brewery Brighton Ld., [1952] A.C. 231, 250 (H.L.).
130 See CRoss & HARius, supra note 84, at 47.
131 (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.).
132 Id. at 375.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 376.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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must be judgment for the defendants."'137 This case is a classic in con-
tracts law and is routinely included in contracts casebooks in the
United States.13
Even though the Raffles court did not explain its reasoning in an
opinion, it is held to have established the important principle that
there can only be a contract if there has been consensus ad idem, or a
"meeting of the minds." 39 Interestingly, this conclusion flows forth
not just from analysis of the issue (was there an enforceable contract
in this situation?) and its resolution (no), but also by considering the
discourse that took place at oral argument. The judges appear to
have resolved the case in the defendants' favor directly after his coun-
sel argued that there was no meeting of the minds.140
Of course, English judges normally do give reasons for deciding
as they do, although that does not mean that they always express the
ratio in a succinct and understandable fashion. As Cross and Harris
observe: "[I] t is comparatively seldom that a judge expressly indicates
the proposition on which he relies as ratio decidendi."1 4 1 Even when
the judge attempts to describe the holding or ratio of a case, his or
her statement of the rule of law may not end the matter. According to
A.L. Goodhart, an expert on the English concept of precedent, "it is
not the rule of law set forth by the court, or the rule enunciated...
which necessarily constitutes the principle of the case. There may be
no rule of law set forth in the opinion, or the rule when stated may be
too wide or too narrow.' 42 Instead, according to Goodhart, the prin-
ciple underlying a decision must be discovered by means of analytic
reasoning.1 4- The judge's opinion regarding the principle of the case
is obviously important, but it need not be decisive. Eugene
Wambaugh, another English scholar, likewise made the point that it is
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., EDwARDJ. MVRPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAw 393-96 (6th ed.
2003).
139 For more on this famous case, see A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to
Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 287 (1989). For another
example of a precedent without opinion, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the
Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).
140 Raffles was not unique in this sense. See Hills v. Laming, (1853) 156 Eng. Rep.
109 (Ex.).
141 See CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 84, at 48.
142 Goodhart, supra note 139, at 165.
143 Id. at 172. Goodhart's method is to derive the principle of a case by finding
(1) the material facts on which the judge based his decision and (2) the decision that
the judge made based on those facts. Id. Thus, if the material facts are A and B, and
the result is X, then in any future case with facts A and B, the result must be X Id. at
169.
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not the words or the language of judges that constitutes the force of
precedent.144 Blackstone was more blunt, stating that the law and the
opinion of the judge are not the same thing, because the judge may mis-
take the law."45
The situation is further complicated when there is more than one
opinion, as there often is in English appellate cases. For example,
when three justices decide a case in the Court of Appeal, one may
write an opinion in favor of the plaintiff for reason A, the second may
write a separate opinion in favor of the plaintiff for reason B, and the
third may deliver her own opinion in favor of the defendant.1 4 6 The
plaintiff has won the case, but on what ground? Can such a decision
have any precedential value at all?
A more likely scenario is that two justices agree on the outcome
and write separate judgments expressing overlapping but nonetheless
distinct motivations for deciding as they did. Even experienced
judges can have trouble identifying the ratio in such cases. One rule
of thumb that has been developed is that the narrower ground for the
court's decision should be viewed as the ratio decidendi of the case, 147
but this rule only helps if the two judgments differ merely in the
breadth or narrowness of their proposed rule.
Finding the ratio is even more difficult if the case was decided by
a court with more than three members, such as the House of Lords or
the former Court of Exchequer Chamber. In one recent case, Aldous,
L.J., of the Court of Appeal discussed a case that had been decided in
the nineteenth century by the Court of Exchequer Chamber and in
which several judges had expressed an opinion. Aldous began with
the opinion of Erie, J., which Aldous found significant because several
subsequent cases had referred to it, and quoted a paragraph consist-
ing of around eighteen lines of text.148 After a brief discussion,
Aldous then recited another fifteen lines from Erle's opinion. 149
Aldous then quoted a long paragraph from the opinion of Vaughan
Williams, J., in the same case, consisting of twenty-five lines of text.1 50
144 EUGENE WAMiAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 6-8 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1891).
145 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *70-71.
146 The same problem arises when a panel deciding a case has only two judges, as
some Court of Appeal cases currently do, and they issue different judgments reaching
the same result. See, e.g., Enfield London Borough Council v. B (a minor), [2000] 1
All E.R. 255, 256-62 (C.A.).
147 CRoss & HARRIs, supra note 84, at 61.
148 Ord v. Upton, [20003 1 All E.R. 193, 200 (C.A.).
149 Id. at 200-01.
150 Id. at 201.
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This was followed by a relatively short six-line excerpt from the opin-
ion of Cresswell, J. 15 Wrightman, J., was of a similar view, according
to Aldous, as illustrated by the citation of twenty-one lines of text from
Wrightman's opinion.15 2 Aldous then quoted twenty-one lines from
the opinion of Baron Parke, who elaborated on the points made by
the other judges.15 3
Admittedly, extensive quotation of no less than five separate opin-
ions from a single precedential case is not the norm in English appel-
late cases. But lengthy excerpts from opinions in previous cases,
sometimes going on for several pages, are quite common. This prac-
tice shows, in my view, that while the gist or general principle of a case
may be fairly clear from reading the various opinions, there is no way
to identify in a definitive way the exact proposition for which the case
stands when there are multiple substantive opinions that concur in
the result.
Having fewer opinions does not always simplify matters. Consider
the recent case of Re Gilligan,'54 decided by the House of Lords. The
longest opinion was by Lord Steyn. 155 Lord Clyde delivered an opin-
ion largely agreeing with Lord Steyn but nonetheless expressing his
own views on the matter in three or four pages.156 Lord Cooke of
Thorndon also agreed with Lord Steyn but added two or three
paragraphs of his own observations.15 7 Lord Browne-Wilkenson
agreed with Steyn, Cooke of Thorndon, and Clyde. 158 Lord Hope of
Craighead agreed with Steyn and Clyde. 15 9 It stands to reason that the
views expressed by Lord Steyn will be of great importance in deter-
mining the holding of this case, but the opinion of Lord Clyde must
also be given serious consideration, and even the points made by Lord
Cooke of Thorndon cannot be ignored entirely, since he also agreed
with the outcome.
Because of the difficulty of extracting a precise ratio decidendi
from multiple opinions, there now seems to be general agreement
among English judges that in cases where a clear rule is desirable, the
court should issue a single opinion that is delivered by one judge, and
in which the remaining judges-or, at least, a majority-concur with-
151 Id. at 201-02.
152 Id. at 202-03.
153 Id. at 200-03.
154 [2000] 1 All E.R. 113 (H.L.).
155 Id. at 115-25.
156 Id. at 125-28.
157 Id. at 125.
158 Id. at 115.
159 Id. at 125.
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out elaboration. 60 This is the reason that the criminal division of the
Court of Appeal typically speaks with one voice, in the form of a single
opinion of the court. A 1965 report on the Court of Criminal Appeal
expresses the reasoning as follows:
It is of considerable advantage we think that those who have to
administer the criminal law and who are bound by the decisions of
the court of Criminal Appeal should have one judgment only
expounding the relevant law rather than having to consider several
judgments in one case and possibly have to distil out of these a
ground of decision which is common to all.161
Clarity is obviously of paramount importance in criminal matters,
where the rule of law dictates that there be rules, that these rules be
made and promulgated in advance, and that they be understandable
to those who must follow them.1 62 These efforts to promote clarity via
single opinions come close to "codifying" the criminal law by essen-
tially requiring that it be written down in definitive textual form.
Yet despite some exceptions, English lawyers and judges have
generally resisted the textualization (or codification) of the common
law. One avenue of resistance has been maintaining the traditional
practice of delivering multiple opinions. As Lord Reid once said:
With the passage of time I have come more and more firmly to the
conclusion that it is never wise to have only one speech in this
House dealing with an important question of law. My main reason
is that experience has shown that those who have to apply the deci-
sion to other cases . . . seem to find it difficult to avoid treating
sentences and phrases in a single speech as if they were provisions
in an Act of Parliament. They do not seem to realise that it is not
the function of noble and learned Lords or indeed of any judges to
frame definitions or to lay down hard and fast rules.1 6 -"
More recently, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to language in a
Court of Appeal case, and commented that "words in a judgment
should not be taken out of context and construed as though they were
a statutory provision. 1 64 Clearly, when there are multiple opinions, it
is almost impossible to single out a phrase or sentence or paragraph,
taken from one of the opinions, as constituting the authoritative
expression of the court. In such a system, judicial decisions remain
160 PATERSON, supra note 87, at 98.
161 REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEAL, 1965, Cmnd. 2755, at 57, quoted in CROSS & HARs, supra note 84, at 94.
162 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 (rev. ed. 1969); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 209 (rev. ed. 1999).
163 Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1084-85 (H.L.).
164 Roebuck v. Mungovin, [19943 2 A.C. 224, 236 (H.L.).
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fundamentally distinct from legislation, where 
the exact words of a
statute are agreed upon in advance by a majority of the legislature 
and
enacted into law. To change the statute requires 
that a formal amend-
ment procedure be followed. In contrast, the 
ratio decidendi retains
a certain measure of fluidity. It is subject to interpretation 
and rein-
terpretation, in a way that an act of the legislature 
typically is not. In
some very real ways, the common law of England, 
even today, remains
lex non scripta.
But the winds of change are blowing. The move 
towards deliver-
ing opinions of the court, as is currently the 
practice in the Criminal
Division of the Court of Appeals, seems to be 
leading to decisions that
are decidedly more textual. We have seen 
that the tradition in
England has been, and to a large extent still 
is, for judges to deliver
their opinions seriatim, and that when doing 
so, it is customary for
judges to state what they would do if it were up to them (as 
in "I would
dismiss the appeal"). If the majority agrees, the appeal is dismissed.
With opinions of the court, however, this tentativeness 
is disappear-
ing. Below are a few examples from cases of 
the Criminal Division of
the Court of Appeals:
"[W]e regard the convictions as safe and the appeals against 
convic-
tion must therefore be dismissed."
1 65
"The appeals are accordingly dis
m isse d .' 166
"We therefore dismiss the appeal."'
67
Not only do judges on the Court of Criminal Appeal announce
their ultimate judgment more boldly, but they likewise seem 
much
more inclined than English judges traditionally have been to 
set forth
the ratio decidendi in a relatively succinct and 
clear fashion. In
Regina v. Sharkey,168 Lord Bingham of Cornhill's 
opinion for the court
started as follows:
The question raised by this appeal may be shortly stated: 
may a
court dealing with an offender under s 40 of 
the Criminal justice
Act 1991 order the offender's return to prison 
to serve the
unexpired part of his sentence, if at the time of making 
the order
the offender is already in custody following his 
recall pursuant to s
39 of the 1991 Act?
169
165 R. v. M., [2000] 1 All E.R. 148, 159 (C.A.).
166 R. v. Boreman, [2000] 1 All E.R. 307, 319 (C.A.).
167 R. v. Sharkey, [2000] 1 All E.R. 15, 21 (C.A.).
168 [2000] 1 All E.R. 15 (C.A.).
169 Id. at 16.
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After explaining its reasoning, the court finished with: "We conclude
that the correct answer to the question posed at the outset of this
judgment is Yes."' 70 Notice how easy it is to extract a textual holding
from this opinion, by turning the initial question into a declarative
sentence:
A court dealing with an offender under s 40 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1991 may order the offender's return to prison to serve the
unexpired part of his sentence, if at the time of making the order
the offender is already in custody following his recall pursuant to s
39 of the 1991 Act.
It may also be that English judges feel a need to express their
holdings more clearly when overruling an earlier case. In Roebuck v.
Mungovin,'7 for instance, the House of Lords overruled a precedent
of the Court of Appeal.' 72 There was only one substantive opinion by
Lord Browne-Wilkenson, in which the remaining four lords con-
curred without elaboration. Browne-Wilkenson's opinion concluded
that the precedent in question should be overruled.1 73 Perhaps
because this might leave the state of the law in doubt, he continued by
explicitly setting forth the new standard: "Where a plaintiff has been
guilty of inordinate and inexcusable delay which has prejudiced the
defendant, subsequent conduct by the defendant which induces the
plaintiff to incur further expense in pursuing the action does not, in
law, constitute an absolute bar preventing the defendant from
obtaining a striking-out order."1 74 Because there were no separate
concurring opinions, Lord Browne-Wilkenson's textual formulation
essentially speaks for the entire court and makes the ratio of the case
abundantly clear.
For the most part, however, English courts seem to resist expres-
sing their holdings so directly. It may be that the phenomenon of a
single opinion boldly announcing clear rules of law will be limited to a
certain class of cases, particularly criminal appeals. Even in criminal
cases it is not yet the norm, as far as I can tell. English courts there-
fore remain reluctant to textualize their holdings by expressing rules
of law in authoritative form. As an expert on English law, A.W.B.
Simpson, has written, "it is a feature of the common law system that
there is no way of settling the correct text or formulation of the rules,
170 Id. at 21.
171 [1994] 2 A.C. 224, 236 (H.L.).
172 Id. at 236-37.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 236.
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so that it is inherently impossible to state so much as a single rule in
what Pollock called 'any authentic form of words.'- 1 75
American courts, as we will now see, have journeyed quite a bit
further on the road to textualization. In the United States, finding
the correct text or formulation of a rule is not nearly as elusive as it
once was.
II. PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The situation in the American colonies was originally not all that
different from that in England, whence their legal system largely
came. Pre-revolutionary lawyers tended to rely on law books imported
from England, including case reports. There were courts in the colo-
nies, of course, and they produced judicial decisions, but reports of
those decisions were not contemporaneously published. 76
Interestingly, lawyers of the time often had manuscript reports of
American cases that they either made themselves or copied from the
notes of someone else who had been present in court. This practice,
of course, is not unlike the Year Book period in England. 177 Also simi-
lar to earlier developments in England is that colonial lawyers were
commonly trained by attending court sessions in colonial capitals and
taking notes of the proceedings. These notes were useful not only for
educating them in the profession, but might come in handy in their
subsequent law practices. 178
A. The Formative Years
After independence, printed law reports began to appear in the
American states. Not surprisingly, reliance on English cases was felt to
be inconsistent with independence and the development of a distinct
American legal system. But if lawyers and judges were to rely on
American cases, they needed accurate reports. Memory and hearsay
could not keep up with an expanding body of case law. An early
American reporter, Ephraim Kirby, explained the need to report and
publish cases, commenting that "the principles of judges'] decisions
175 A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 89 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d series, 1973) (citing F. Pollack, A FIRST BOOK
OFJURSPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1911)).
176 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HisTORy OF AMERICAN LAW 59-61 (3d ed. 2005). A
few pre-Revolutionary cases were published after independence. Dallas included
some early Pennsylvania cases in early volumes of the United States Reports, for
instance. See, e.g., Stackhouse's Lessee v. Stackhouse, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 80 (Pa. 1766).
177 Surrency, supra note 62, at 50-51.
178 Id. at 48-50.
[VOL. 82:31222
THE TEXTUALIZATION OF PRECEDENT
were soon forgot, or misunderstood, or erroneously reported from
memory." 179
These early reports were the result of private enterprise, although
judges sometimes cooperated with the reporters. This was similar to
English practice at the time. Also similar was that appellate judges
delivered their opinions orally and seriatim. Thus, an American
report of the time would have resulted from a private individual sit-
ting in a courtroom, taking notes of what the lawyers argued and the
opinions or judgments that the judges delivered, and publishing a
synopsis of the proceedings. 180
An example of early American reports are those by Dallas, who
reported cases both by the Pennsylvania state courts and the United
States Supreme Court, printing them all in a single volume entitled
United States Reports. Dallas included in those reports a pre-Revolu-
tionary case from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Taxier v. Sweet,181
consisting of five pages of the facts and the arguments of counsel.
Like cases from the Year Book period, it ends with a single short para-
graph stating that the judges were divided on the issue of whether the
plaintiff had a cause of action, but agreed that the court had jurisdic-
tion.182 In other cases from this period-perhaps those felt to be
more important-the reports indicate that the judges delivered rela-
tively lengthy seriatim opinions,183 just as the House of Lords still does
today. As one might expect, these opinions exhibit distinct signs of
orality. In one case a lawyer refers to an apparently unreported deci-
sion that he personally witnessed.' 84
In the United States Supreme Court, opinions were also origi-
nally delivered seriatim. They likewise contain clear indications of
orality, even though it seems likely that the Justices were speaking on
the basis of notes or even reading from text they had written down
beforehand. An illustration is Georgia v. Brailsford,18 5 where the state
of Georgia sought an injunction to stay a proceeding in the Circuit
Court of Georgia. The report mentions that "after argument, the
179 EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, at iii (Litchfield, Conn., Collier & Adam 1789).
180 Moaius L. COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 16-17 (9th ed. 1989); see also
DAWSON, supra note 23, at 85-86 ("In law reporting the American states for a time...
relied on private enterprise.").
181 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 81 (Pa. 1766).
182 Id. at 85.
183 See, e.g., Gorgerat v. McCarty, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 144 (Pa. 1792).
184 Pleasants v. Pemberton, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 196, 197 (Pa. 1793).
185 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). The case caption misspells the second name as
Braisiford.
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Judges delivered their opinions seriatim."'
8 6 justice Johnson speaks
first, discloses his reasoning, and concludes that "in 
my opinion ...
there is not a proper foundation for issuing an 
injunction."18 7 Next is
Justice Iredell, who, after pointing out 
that he sat on the circuit court
that decided the case at issue, ends his discussion 
by stating that "I
think, that an injunction should be awarded."
'88 Justice Blair concurs
with Iredell's conclusion but adds some of his 
own reasoning. Wilson
starts out with a personal observation that is 
reminiscent of the emo-
tions and internal conflicts expressed even today 
by English judges: "I
confess, that I have not been able to form an 
opinion which is per-
fectly satisfactory to my own mind, upon the 
points which have been
discussed."' 8 9 He refers to what is apparently 
an unreported case: "I
remember an action was instituted and sustained, 
some years ago, in
the name of Louis XVI. king of France, against 
Mr. Robert Morris, in
the Supreme court of Pennsylvania."
'1 90 He concludes rather lamely
that he has "no objection" to the requested remedy.
1 91 Justice Cush-
ing comes out against an injunction: "I think that an injunction 
ought
not to be awarded." 1
92 Finally, Chief Justice Jay, like Iredell, begins
with a personal observation: "My first ideas 
were unfavorable to the
motion; but many reasons have been urged, 
which operate forcibly to
produce a change of opinion. "193 His conclusion 
is also rather wimpy:
"I am content, that the injunction issue."
194
A year later the parties were once again 
before the Supreme
Court in a futile attempt to have the injunction dissolved.
195 The
report starts with an opinion by Iredell, who 
declares it "my misfor-
tune to dissent from the opinion entertained 
by the rest of the court"
and proceeds to explain why.
196 His words apparently struck a chord
in Justice Blair, who delivers the next opinion: 
"My sentiments have
coincided, 'till this moment, with the sentiments 
entertained by the
majority of the Court; but a doubt has just occurred, which 
I think it
my duty to declare."' 9
7 After Blair is finished, Justice Jay, speaking for
186 Id. at 405.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 406.
189 Id. at 407.
190 Id. It seems likely that there would have 
been some sort of report of this case,
but Wilson provides no citation (unless the reporter omitted 
it).
191 Id. at 408.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 409.
195 Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415 (1793).
196 Id. at 415-17.
197 Id. at 417-18.
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the rest of the Court, continued the injunction.1 98 Blair's spontane-
ous change of heart suggests that in this era oral opinions were still
possible on the Supreme Court.
At the same time, it seems likely that American judges at the close
of the eighteenth century were already beginning to draft their opin-
ions in writing, certainly in difficult cases, and giving the text to the
reporter after they read it or summarized it in open court. 199 In a case
decided in 1800, Bas v. Tingy, 2 00 Justice Chase makes a revealing com-
ment when his turn to speak arrives:
TheJudges agreeing unanimously in their opinion, I presumed
that the sense of the Court would have been delivered by the presi-
dent; and therefore, I have not prepared a formal argument on the
occasion. I find no difficulty, however, in assigning the general rea-
sons, which induce me to concur in affirming the decree of the Cir-
cuit Court.
20 1
Chase was evidently caught by surprise; he had expected the mat-
ter to be handled by an opinion of the court prepared by the chief or
most senior associate justice, rather than seriatim opinion delivery.
That did not stop him from delivering an oral opinion on the spot,
which suggests that it was not unusual to do so. But the incident also
reveals that it had become customary to "prepare[ I a formal argu-
ment" beforehand.
Given that the American notion of precedent and the case law
method were borrowed from the English motherland, it stands to rea-
son that the American conception of precedent during the latter half
of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth would
be similar to that in England. As did the English, the early American
legal profession viewed the common law as something distinct from
decided cases. The cases were merely evidence of the law, which
existed independently. Moreover, the opinions of judges could be
stronger or weaker evidence. Sometimes several cases would be
needed to establish a point. On other occasions, even that was not
enough. As Chancellor Kent remarked, "[e]ven a series of decisions
are not always conclusive evidence of what is law."2 0 2 American law-
yers would probably have agreed with the traditional English notion
that the common law resided in the collective memory of the legal
198 Id. at 418-19.
199 SeeJohns v. Nichols, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 184, 188 (Pa. 1792), where it is specifically
noted that the Chief Justice provided a draft of an opinion to the reporter.
200 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
201 Id. at 43.
202 JAMES KENT, I COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *444,
20071 1225
[VOL. 82:3
1226 NOTRE DA.A REVIEW
profession, rather than in the text of judicial opinions contained 
in
printed reports.
20 3
Early on, however, American practice in the delivery 
and report-
ing of decisions began to diverge from its English 
roots in significant
ways. This would eventually lead to a very different-and 
eventually,
more textual-conceptualization of the notion of 
precedent.
B. American Innovations
1. Opinions in Writing
A major American innovation is that appellate judges came to be
required, often via legislation or even constitutional 
provision, to issue
their opinions in writing.
20 4 Connecticut adopted such a statute in
1785, and many states followed suit.
2 0 5 Other courts, like the United
States Supreme Court, adopted the practice 
on their own initiative.
20 6
Today, although some states allow appellate judges to deliver
what are called "memorandum opinions," in which 
they decide the
case with only a summary opinion or no opinion 
at all, the majority of
states require their highest court to deliver 
all decisions in writing.
20 7
Other states, like California, require not only its 
supreme court,
but all courts of appeal, to make decisions "in 
writing with reasons
stated,"208 a rule that mandates a full written opinion 
in all appellate
cases. Because it is generally only appellate 
cases that function as
binding precedent, this effectively means that in 
most American juris-
dictions, only written opinions can have precedential 
value.
While the shift in the mode of delivering opinions 
might not
seem all that significant, it signals an important 
development in the
nature of precedent. Recall that in England, it is 
possible (though not
common) for a case to function as a precedent without any 
opinion at
all. Raffles is a famous example.209 Knowing the state of existing law,
it is possible to deduce a principle of decision from 
the facts and the
outcome. In Raffles, the argument of counsel was also very 
helpful.
Requiring written opinions suggests that the precedential 
value of a
case consists not in how it was decided, but in the 
reasons and analysis
203 See Frederick G. Kempin,Jr., Precedent and Stare 
Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to
1850, 3 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 37-38 (1959).
204 Surrency, supra note 62, at 55.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 86-87.
208 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
209 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. 
Div.); see discussion
supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
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expressed in the writing. Eventually it will no longer be the decision
that functions as a precedent, but the judge's opinion justifying that
decision.
2. Official Reporters
Another American development is that during the first half of the
nineteenth century, states began to appoint official reporters. 210 Mas-
sachusetts did so in 1804.21 The statute required the reporter to
obtain "true and authentic" reports of the decisions of the state's
Supreme Judicial Council and to publish them annually.21 2 The Fed-
eral Supreme Court was authorized by Congress to appoint an official
reporter in 1817.213 By 1850, most states had official reporters for
their highest courts. 214 As opposed to England, where even today
there is no completely authoritative version of case reports, the prac-
tice of appointing reporters eventually led to the notion that the
reports produced by that reporter-and only those reports-are
deemed the "official" version of the court's decision. While private
reporters can and do exist in the United States, the reports that they
publish must be true to this official version. Thus, there can generally
be only one fully authoritative text of any particular opinion.
Even though books containing judicial opinions are still called
"reports" in the United States, they are no longer the result of a
"reporter" going to court and "reporting" the proceedings. Because
appellate judges must generally issue written opinions, the "reports"
consist almost entirely of opinions drafted by the judges themselves,
and they are normally published verbatim. All the reporter does is
obtain a copy of the opinion from the court, add some information
(typically, a summary and headnotes), and print it. 2 15 Any unofficial
reports do essentially the same thing, although the summary and
headnotes will obviously be different. Where there are multiple
reports of a single case, the only real difference in the text of the
opinions consists of relatively trivial distinctions like the font used, the
pagination, and the citation format. Interestingly, the use of one pub-
lisher's pagination by another publisher has led to lawsuits for copy-
right infringement, which highlights how little the modern reporter
210 Surrency, supra note 62, at 56.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TIHE UNITFr) STATES:
TIAE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 389 (Paul A. Freund &
Stanley N. Katz, eds., 1988).
214 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 86 (footnote omitted).
215 See Surnency, supra note 62, at 60.
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contributes to the content of a report.216 Another indication of the
relatively minimal contribution by American reporters is that for the
past century and a half, the reports are no longer identified by their
names (e.g., Cranch's Reports), but by the jurisdiction (e.g., United
States Reports).
At the same time, reporters have become more professional. The
earliest American reporters were often practicing lawyers for whom
reporting was only a sideline. Being a lawyer has the advantage that
the reporter better understands what is happening, which is no doubt
the reason that English reporters-while no longer having judges
among their ranks-are traditionally banristers. But problems can
arise when practicing lawyers act as reporters. One is that they may
have their own views on an issue involved in a case that they have to
report. For instance, Henry Wheaton, who reported decisions of the
Supreme Court in the early 1800s, had strong opinions on admiralty
law, which was one of the major preoccupations of the Supreme Court
at the time. Although Wheaton's reports were generally of good
repute, his views on admiralty law may have influenced how he
reported a couple of cases in which he was particularly interested. 2 17
The difficulties are multiplied if the reporter is simultaneously argu-
ing cases before the court. Wheaton did so on several occasions. It
would only be human nature-to which Wheaton occasionally suc-
cumbed-to give greater prominence to one's own arguments in the
reports, and to give short shrift to those of one's opponents. 2 18
Gradually the level of professionalism increased, but concurrently
the office became more bureaucratic and less creative. Wheaton even-
tually decided that the reporter's job was "mechanical drudgery" and
that he was born for better things.21 9 A New York reporter, George
Caines, came to a similar conclusion, writing that he did little more
than "arranging the materials received, and giving, in a summary man-
ner, the arguments adduced." 2 20
The reliability of the printed text remained an issue throughout
the nineteenth century. Even though most courts had an official
reporter, reporting practices were still not exact enough to promote
particularly close reading of the text. Judges produced handwritten
216 In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834), the Supreme Court held
that a reporter did not have a copyright in the cases he reported. On the issue of
whether pagination is covered by copyright, see Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g
Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).
217 3-4 WutiTE, supra note 213, at 392-400.
218 Id. at 392.
219 Id. at 401.
220 Finret)MAN, supra note 176, at 243.
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manuscripts that were often hard to decipher, and printers were
prone to make errors in setting the text. Around 1850, the situation
began to improve when printers provided proofs of majority opinions
to the justices who wrote them, allowing them to be corrected before
publication. 22'
American reporters today, although they generally still have legal
training, do not normally practice law and have become part of the
bureaucracy of the courts. They are professionals who receive the text
of opinions from the court (or sometimes directly from the judge)
and are expected to reproduce them verbatim, with only minor edito-
rial adjustments. The reporter then provides copies to the publishers
(including online publishers) as well as to the public. The reporter
also generally supervises printing of the opinions in the official
reports, if the jurisdiction has them.222
Even unofficial reports, whether in the United States or England,
generally adhere to high professional standards. Unofficial publishers
typically add their own summaries, headnotes, and other materials,
but it would be a serious problem if they altered the judge's opinion
in any substantive way.
As a result, there is generally only one authoritative text of a judi-
cial opinion in the United States, even if it appears in different sets of
reports. The authoritativeness of the text derives not just from its
accuracy, as guaranteed by professional reporters, but even more from
the fact that a legal actor herself wrote the words. The judge thus
speaks through the words of the text, unmediated by a reporter writ-
ing down or summarizing what the judge said. Those words are pub-
lished exactly as he drafted them.
3. The Elimination of Seriatim Opinions
Americanjudges also departed from English practice by eliminat-
ing seriatim opinion delivery. Recall that seriatim opinions are still
used in some of the English appellate courts, notably the House of
Lords and the civil branch of the Court of Appeal. In its purest form,
this method of opinion delivery requires each member of the court to
221 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 311 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974).
222 See, e.g., Arkansas Judiciary, Reporter of Decisions, http://courts.state.ar.us/
courts/rd info.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007); Clerk of the Supreme Court, Reporter
of the Supreme Court, http://wwwkscourts.org/clerk.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007);
New York State, Law Reporting Bureau, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter (last
visited Jan. 16, 2007); Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Office of the
Reporter of Decisions (1804-present), http://www.massreports.com (last visited Jan.
16, 2007).
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express his views on how the case should be decided, and why. Until
the early-nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court often
delivered its opinions seriatim, even in cases raising difficult constitu-
tional issues. 22 3
ChiefJustice Marshall ended the practice when he was appointed
to the Supreme Court in 1801. Marshall laid heavy emphasis on pro-
ducing opinions of the court, in which one opinion was delivered
(usually by Marshall himself) that spoke for all the judges, and which
was almost certainly written out in full beforehand. The delivery of a
single opinion lent a strong sense of cohesiveness and legitimacy to
the early decisions of the Marshall era.224
Scholars have often commented on the high degree of unanimity
exhibited by the Marshall court in its early years, a time during which
most cases were disposed of by an opinion of the court with few sepa-
rate concurring and dissenting opinions.2 25 This might suggest that
judicial opinions of this time, and particularly the text of those deci-
sions, would have a very high degree of authority, leading us to con-
clude that during the Marshall era there was a distinct tendency
towards textualizing case law. In reality, this would be the wrong con-
clusion. The perception of unanimity was in some senses misleading.
The remarkably collegial nature of the Court at the time (they gener-
ally ate and boarded together) discouraged the justices from writing
separate opinions. Moreover, the fact that the opinion was not usually
circulated before being delivered made it practically quite difficult to
write a concurrence or dissent. As a historian of the Court has
observed:
The result of noncirculation was to make an opinion of the
Court a highly individualized product that certainly cannot be con-
sidered a concerted effort of a united court. An opinion of the
Court merely reflected one Justice's effort to advance a formal justi-
fication for a majority decision made orally and informally. Thus
the perception of a united Court speaking in one voice that repre-
sented all its members is ilusory. 2 26
Consequently, although the Court at the time delivered "opin-
ions of the Court," those opinions could not really be viewed as prod-
ucts of collective authorship where each of the Justices agreed with its
exact words. Often they had not even read the opinion before they
223 2 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15
pt.2, at 382-83 (1981).
224 Id. at 382-89.
225 3-4 WHITE, supra note 213, at 186-87.
226 Id. at 189.
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heard it delivered. At best, the opinion would have represented their
views only in a relatively general sense.
The practice of delivering a single unanimous opinion began to
decline in the mid 1820s, when an increasing number of concurring
and dissenting opinions started to appear. 227 The Court began to
speak primarily through majority opinions, as it still does today, rather
than mostly through unanimous opinions of the court.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, the presence of concur-
ring and dissenting opinions can actually make the text of majority
opinions more authoritative. lfjudges can read the text of a proposed
majority opinion, with the opportunity to draft a concurring or dis-
senting opinion, one can assume that members of the majority who
did not write separately endorse the wording of the opinion. The
writer of a majority opinion has to take into account the views of all
judges who sign it, and must therefore produce a text that has been
read and approved by them all. This is not unlike legislation, where
the text of a statute is debated and changed until a majority of
lawmakers is willing to vote for it.
4. Declining Significance of Headnotes and Argument of Counsel
Two ways in which reporters traditionally added value to their
product was by prefacing each case with one or more headnotes, as
well as by summarizing the arguments of the lawyers. Arguments of
counsel were considered important not only because they provided
some context to the judge's decisions, but also because they were
intrinsically useful in understanding the law. The lawyers who argued
before the courts were normally experts in their field and may well
have known more about a specialized subject than the judges.
Reporters could likewise be quite knowledgeable about the law.
As mentioned above, some of them were prominent lawyers. What a
reporter wrote about a case might therefore be considered almost as
important as what the deciding judges said in their opinions. 228 Espe-
cially at a time when judges were issuing seriatim opinions, the synop-
sis of a reporter in the form of a summary or headnote could be
extremely helpful in finding the ratio decidendi of the case.
The nature of headnotes underwent a subtle change after Rich-
ard Peters was appointed reporter for the Supreme Court in 1828.29
Peters added headnotes with references to the page where the particu-
227 Id. at 193.
228 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
229 3-4 WrITE, supra note 213, at 406.
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lar point could be found.2 30 Similar headnotes remain a feature of
modern reports. They can send lawyers directly to the part of the
opinion that addresses an issue of concern to them. It can save law-
yers the burden-if it is one-of reading the entire opinion. The
downside, of course, is that the context provided by reading the com-
plete opinion can easily be overlooked in favor of concentrating on a
few crucial sentences or paragraphs. It encourages lawyers to look for
the bits of text in the opinion that are useful to their cause, and to
ignore the rest.
A contemporary criticism of Peters' headnotes is revealing: that
he did little more than to extract sentences or paragraphs from the
opinion, rather than to correctly and succinctly summarize the hold-
ing.2 3 1 As historian G. Edward White has observed, "Peters merely
copied down the Court's language," forcing readers "to make their
own judgments about the precise holdings of cases, the very task that
headnote summaries were supposed to perform."232
The implication is that it was usually not possible in those days to
find a few sentences in an opinion where the court itself expressed its
holding in a succinct and authoritative fashion. It was still necessary
to conduct traditional legal analysis to find the ratio decidendi of the
case, and apparently Peters was not up to the task. But the idea of
having a series of headnotes, each linked to a specific part of the case,
continues to this day. It clearly fosters a more textual reading of an
opinion.
During the mid-1800s reporters still routinely included a sum-
mary of the arguments of counsel, although whether they should do
so was a matter of debate. One posited reason for including the argu-
ments was that the opinions expressed by judges did not constitute the
law, but were merely evidence of independently existing principles.
This, of course, harked back to the view long espoused in England
that the opinions of its judges were merely evidence of the common
law. It had an interesting implication for how opinions should be
reported. The arguments of distinguished counsel, it was suggested,
or perhaps even the perceptive analysis of the reporter, might some-
times be better evidence of the state of the law than the opinion of a
mediocre judge.23 3 That point of view eventually lost out, of course,
and summaries of the arguments of counsel disappeared from the
reports, as did any commentary by the reporter. By the end of the
230 Id. at 407.
231 Id. at 407-08.
232 Id. at 408.
233 5 SWISHER, supra note 221, at 297-98.
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nineteenth century it was clear that the American 
common law was no
longer viewed as something contained in the minds 
of the legal pro-
fession. Rather, it consisted of the written words 
of judges.
5. Hierarchical Organization of the Courts
Finally, the words of American appellate 
judges were more
authoritative than those of their English 
counterparts in another
sense. In England at the time, the judges of the royal courts 
main-
tained a certain collegiality, often discussing 
legal matters in the inns
of court or formally gathering in the Exchequer 
Chamber to collec-
tively decide an important issue.
2 3 4 There were certainly disputes and
rivalries between the courts, but following precedent 
did not normally
involve one court imposing its will upon another. 
Instead, precedent
consisted of the notion that once judges decided a question 
in a par-
ticular way, they and their colleagues should decide 
that issue in the
same way in future cases.
235 Precedent was a matter of judicial econ-
omy (not having to relitigate a question), fairness (parties 
in different
cases should be treated the same), and predictability.
23 6 This aspect
of precedent, as noted earlier, is generally referred 
to as stare decisis.
American courts, in contrast, were organized 
hierarchically virtu-
ally from the beginning. The typical system is for 
a state to have trial
courts, whose decisions are reviewed by courts of 
appeal. Decisions by
the courts of appeal are subject to discretionary review by the 
state's
supreme court. Trial judges are not bound by the decisions 
of other
trial judges, nor are they necessarily bound by their own previous 
deci-
sions. For the most part, only opinions written 
by appellate judges can
function as precedent.
2 7 Those cases generally act as precedent in
two ways: They are considered binding not only 
on other appellate
judges in the same court, but on any lower courts as well. Thus, 
prece-
dent has come to mean not just that judges, as a policy matter, 
should
normally follow their own previous decisions, 
but that lower courts
must follow the decisions of judges above them in the hierarchy.
From the perspective of the lower court judges, the word of 
the higher
courts-in particular, the written word-is law.
In summary, during the first full century following 
American
independence, the courts of the United States undertook 
a number of
innovations that laid the groundwork for a more 
textual conception
234 DAWSON, supra note 23, at 60.
235 See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 205-19.
236 Id.
237 FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 241-44 ("With few exceptions, 
official reports
contained only appellate opinions.").
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of precedent. The tradition of seriatim opinions came to an end
under Justice Marshall, ultimately to be replaced by majority opinions
that were read and subscribed to by the Justices who agreed with
them. The office of the reporter was made official and later became
bureaucratized, resulting ultimately in reports that were more authori-
tative textually. Judges began to examine the proofs of their opinions,
further ensuring their accuracy. Headnotes gave lawyers easy access to
the part of the opinion that contained the exact language that they
sought. And "extraneous" matter, such as the arguments of counsel,
disappeared.
It is probably fair to say that by the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the modern American notion of precedent and of common law
decisionmaking was already beginning to form. The profession was
no longer adhering to the notion that judges merely declared the
common law. Rather, judges could establish principles and rules for
deciding cases in their opinions. And increasingly, a single case on
point could bind a later court.2 3 8
At the same time, judges did not normally write opinions in a way
that made it possible to identify a specific sentence or paragraph as
containing the holding of the case. It was still too soon to speak of
precedent being textualized. But the essential ingredients were in
place. During the twentieth century the tendency to view precedent
as textual would only intensify.
C. The Codification Movement
If judicial opinions were gradually becoming more textual over
the years, there was another American phenomenon that involved
turning the common law into authoritative text in one fell swoop.
This was the codification movement.
European countries (aside from Great Britain) have been famil-
iar with codification for centuries. The most notable example is the
famous Code Napoleon, which influenced the development of codes
throughout Europe and much of the rest of the world.239 Typically,
civil law countries have a number of different codes, such as a civil
code and a criminal code. These codes are the primary source of law
in such countries. Significantly, there is nothing quite like the com-
238 See Kempin, supra note 203, at 41.
239 Louis Baudouin, The Influence of the Code Napoleon, 33 TUL. L. REv. 21 (1958).
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mon law on the continent. At least in theory, judges do not make law;
all they can do is interpret and apply the code.2 40
The great advantage of a code is that all the law on a particular
subject is in one place. If a French or German lawyer needs to
research a question about the criminal law, she theoretically need
only to consult the code. In practice, of course, things are never this
simple. The code may not answer the French lawyer's question, forc-
ing her to research judgments of the courts and other legal literature.
The hope entertained byJeremy Bentham and the French revolution-
aries, among others, that a code could be made so clear that ordinary
people could understand it, and that lawyers would become superflu-
ous, has never been realized.241 Lawyers and judges are inevitably
needed to interpret a code's provisions. But only the code is truly law.
If an English or American lawyer wants to know the law on a par-
ticular subject, she first needs to find out whether there is an act or
statute that bears on the question. This is not always easy because
traditionally acts were bound together into books that contained all
the acts that were passed in a particular year, regardless of subject.
And then the lawyer has to find any judicial opinions on the matter,
which are also usually organized by the year in which they were deliv-
ered. Of course, the English or American lawyer's task is simplified by
digests of cases according to subject matter, as well as private compila-
tions of statutes, also organized by subject. Nonetheless, the concept
that all the law on a particular topic should be available in one
place-a code-is clearly an attractive one.
In England, the great champion of codification was Jeremy Ben-
tham, who is credited with inventing the term. 242 He was motivated by
a strong distaste for lawyers and the common law, at one point urging
citizens of the United States to "shut your ports against our Common
Law, as you would shut them against the plague."2 43 According to
Bentham, the common law was chaotic, confused, and impossible for
the layman to understand. His proposed remedy was to systematize
240 See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CniL LAw TRADITION 19-47 (2d ed.
1985) (explaining statutory interpretation and the role of the judge in countries that
have a civil code).
241 See id. at 28.
242 Helmut Coing, An Intellectual History of European Codification in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, in PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION 16, 16 (S.J. Stoljar ed., 1977).
243 JEREMY BENTHAM, PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
136 (London, Jeremy Bentham, 1817).
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the law into orderly codes, much as the emperor Justinian tried to
rationalize Roman law.2 44
While the notion of reducing centuries of law into a single coher-
ent code, eliminating conflicts and confusion, seems appealing, the
English legal system was extremely reluctant to allow the common law
to be restated by Parliament in authoritative form. There was a seri-
ous attempt to enact a comprehensive criminal code in the mid-nine-
teenth century. But judges and lawyers strongly resisted the effort,
arguing that the common law was superior to written codes. As one
opponent of codification said: "(Tio reduce unwritten law to statute is
to discard one of the greatest blessings we have for ages enjoyed in
rules capable of flexible application." 245 English judges were not giv-
ing up their treasured common law without a fight. As a result of such
opposition, and despite Bentham's prodigious efforts, codification
never made much headway in his native land.2 4 6
Codification was more successful in the United States, where the
common law was not as deeply rooted. Initially, however, the former
colonies were reluctant to write down the principles of the common
law in an authoritative form. Thomas Jefferson wrote in Notes on the
State of Virginia that it was "dangerous to attempt to reduce it to a text"
and that it should be "collected from the usual monuments of it."247
But by roughly the middle of the nineteenth century, there was grow-
ing sentiment in favor of codification. Joseph Story, for example, sug-
gested that codification would add "certainty, clearness, and facility of
reference" to the law; it was therefore "desirable . . . that the laws,
which govern the rights, duties, relations, and business of the people,
should . . .be accessible to them for daily use or consultation. 248
New York held a constitutional convention in 1846 which
required the appointment of commissioners to "reduce into one writ-
ten and systematic code ... the whole body of the law of this state, or
so much or such parts thereof as to the said Commissioners shall seem
244 MAURiCE EUGEN LANG, CODIFICATION IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND AMERICA
33-35 (1924).
245 Parliamentary Papers 1854, vol. 53, p. 391, per TalfourdJ., cited inJ.H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 251 (3rd ed. 1990).
246 See BAKER, supra note 11, at 217-20; LANG, supra note 244, at 40-58.
247 THOMASJEFFERSON, NoTEs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 137 (William Peden ed.,
Univ. of N.C. Press, 1954) (1787).
248 JOSEPH STORY, REPORT OF THE CoMMIssIONERs APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AND
REPORT UPON THF PRACTIC3ABILITY AND ExPEDIENCY OF REDUCING TO A WRIrEN AND
SYSTEMATIC CODE THE COMMON LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS, OR ANY PART THEREOF 31
(Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1837).
1236 [VOL. 82:3
THE TEXTUALIZATION OF PRECEDENT
practicable and expedient."249 The goals of this codification were
noble but overly optimistic, "in order that the people may know the
legal and equitable rules by which they must be governed-that litiga-
tion may be diminished, and justice more speedily administered. "250
The methodology would be to collect all of the existing law, eliminate
inconsistencies, improve it where needed, write it down in a logical
and systematic way, and have the resulting code adopted by the legisla-
ture.251 The New York bar, like the legal profession in England, gen-
erally opposed the idea. Nonetheless, New York eventually adopted a
Code of Procedure (later called the Code of Civil Procedure) that was
widely imitated by other states.2 52 Efforts to codify the substantive law,
or even to codify the entire common law, as David Dudley Field pro-
posed, were met with more limited success. 253
Codification had greater appeal in the West, which did not have
the more established legal traditions and entrenched bar that New
York did. North and South Dakota have complete systems of codes,
for instance. 254 Further west, California also has a comprehensive sys-
tem that includes not only codes of civil procedure and criminal law,
but also roughly thirty separate codes dealing with matters such as
Business and Professions, Commerce, Corporations, Education, Elec-
tions, Finance, Fish and Game, Food and Agriculture, Government,
and even Harbors and Navigation, to list just a few.
Yet despite the plethora of codes that occupy a considerable
amount of shelf space in many a lawyer's office, the common law is
hardly dead in states that have embraced codification. If Bentham's
or Field's goal was to supplant the common law with a series of codes,
the codification movement failed, even in places like the Dakotas and
California. As a lawyer licensed to practice in California, I can attest
that there are some areas of California law where the codes are
extremely important and cover most of the territory. Examples are
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code, and the Probate Code.
But even in these areas, judicial opinions are essential not only to
interpret the code, but also to fill in the many gaps that almost any
249 WILLIAM G. BISHOP & WILLIAM H. A-rREF (REPORTERS), REPORT OF THE
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1846, at 588 (Albany, Evening Atlas 1846).
250 LANc, supra note 244, at 118 n.2 (quoting BISHOP & AlTREE, supra note 249, at
124).
251 Id. at 122.
252 Id. at 128, 130.
253 Id. at 135-36. New York did adopt a Penal Code and a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Id. at 148.
254 Id. at 152-54.
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code will contain. In other areas, including the basic principles of
contract and tort law, the civil code does little more than provide a
broad outline that must be filled in by case law, with the exception of
certain areas in which the legislature has taken an unusual interest.255
Even though the codification movement was only partially suc-
cessful in the United States, it has had the effect of converting broad
swaths of the common law into statutory text. Judges are reduced to
being interpreters of that text. Even in states that have not attempted
to codify entire areas of the law, legislatures often haphazardly textual-
ize bits and pieces of the common law. More and more areas that
were once the province of the common law have been subjected to
legislation.
Following the decline of the codification movement in the nine-
teenth century, there were other attempts to tame the unruly and still
somewhat "unwritten" common law. One of the more ambitious of
such campaigns has been the uniform laws movement. Unlike codifi-
cation, which aimed to rationalize the law and make it accessible to
the common person, the main objective of the uniform law movement
has been to create a body of law in specific subject areas that would be
adopted by many or all states, thus making it consistent across state
borders.256
Since 1892, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws has drafted various uniform laws, including the Uni-
form Probate Code,25 7 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act,2 58 the Uniform Partnership Act,259 and the Uni-
form Interstate Family Support Act.2 60 After the Conference approves
a proposed uniform act, it is sent to state legislators, who are
encouraged to enact it without change. There is great variation in the
success of the various uniform acts that the Conference has proposed
in the past century or so. 26 1 Some have been widely adopted; others
255 On the California Civil Code and its interaction with the common law, see
Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California
Civil Code, 65 CAL. L. REV. 4, 9-12 (1977).
256 See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, "Federal Common Law" in the European
Union: A Comparative Perspective from the United States, 54 Am.J. COMP. L. 1, 66 (2006).
257 UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 1 (1998 & Supp. 2006) (first
approved and promulgated in 1969).
258 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997).
259 UNIF. P'sHi- ACT (1997), 6 U.L.A. 1 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (superseding Uni-
form Partnership Act originally adopted in 1914).
260 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (2001).
261 See Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/Update (follow
"Final Acts and Legislation" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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have met more resistance and have been incorporated 
into the law of
only a few states.
26 2
Uniformity of law is probably most important in 
commerce,
which often involves transactions across state 
borders and where the
legal rules governing the buyer and seller could 
come into conflict. It
is in this domain that the most important 
and successful uniform law
was enacted: the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC). The UCC was
promulgated in the 1940s and 1950s, and by 
1968 it had been enacted
by forty-nine of the fifty states.
26 3
Whatever the benefits of having the same 
law throughout the
states, the adoption of such acts inevitably 
textualizes large expanses
of the law that were formerly governed by judicial decisions. 
Article 2
of the UCC, which governs sales, deals with all aspects 
of contract law,
including offer and acceptance, the interpretation 
of agreements, and
remedies, which were once the exclusive domain 
of case law in most
American jurisdictions. All of these areas are now ruled 
by text, leav-
ing to the common law the largely ancillary 
role of interpreting ambi-
guities and plugging gaps.
2 64 This does not mean that contract law
has been entirely textualized. Outside the area 
of sales, the common
law of contracts still plays a significant role. 
But even here, the influ-
ence of the UCC is substantial.
State law relating to torts or property is far less 
susceptible to uni-
form acts and has retained much of its case 
law character. Nonethe-
less, there is another phenomenon that is effectively 
textualizing even
these remaining bulwarks of the common 
law: the Restatements.
D. Restating the Law
The Restatements of the Law are an initiative 
of the American
Law Institute (ALI), which was founded in 1923.265 One 
of the main
reasons that it was established was the perceived 
uncertainty that
resulted from "lack of agreement among 
the members of the legal
262 For example, the Uniform Commercial 
Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), which was drafted with the aim of unifying the law 
of software licensing, has
only been adopted by two states, Virginia and Maryland, 
and only by them in modi-
fied form. MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE LICENSING 
AND INTERNET LAW 315 (2d
ed. 2003).
263 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CoNTRACrS § 10 (3d ed. 1990). Louisi-
ana adopted parts of the UCC in 1974. Id. The UCC 
was the product of cooperation
between the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. Id.
264 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (2001).
265 American Law Institute Certificate of Incorporation 
(Feb. 23, 1923), available
at http://www.ali.org/ali/AR99_Certificate.htm.
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profession on the fundamental principles of the common law." 266
Lack of clarity was another concern.26 7
The ALI therefore convened groups of legal experts, including
lawyers, judges, and academics, to "restate" the law in a number of
subject areas. 268 In the next couple of decades, Restatements were
published on the law of agency, contracts, judgments, property, resti-
tution, torts, and trusts.269 In recent years, the original Restatements
have been updated, and additional Restatements of other areas of the
law have been adopted.
Unlike the uniform law movement, the Restatements cover some
of the most basic areas of the common law. At the same time, it is not
apparently the aim of the Restatements to textualize the law. In con-
trast to uniform acts, which are intended to be enacted into statutory
law by state legislatures, thus making the text of the act binding within
that jurisdiction, the Restatements are attempts by experts to summa-
rize general common law principles in a relatively clear fashion.
Because each state has its own variations on the common law, usually
modified to some extent by legislation, the Restatements may or may
not accurately reflect the law of any particular jurisdiction. They are
thus nothing more than the opinion of a group of experts on what the
majority rule on some area of the law is, or perhaps what it ought to
be. 270 In the view of most lawyers, the Restatements are influential,
but they are not sources of law. When the director of the ALI referred
to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts as "an authoritative exposi-
tion of the subject,"271 he could have meant only that it was highly
regarded, not that its rules were "authority" in the sense that a statute
is.
In fact, the most useful application of the Restatements has prob-
ably been as a teaching tool. Because almost all law schools in the
United States teach generalized rules of American law, rather than the
266 Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of an American Law Institute, 1 A.L.I. PRoc. 8 (1923) [hereinafter ALI
Report].
267 See id.
268 Id. at 2-3, 12-18.
269 For more on the background of the founding of the ALI, see Nathan M. Crys-
tal, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54 WASH. L. REV. 239 (1979);
N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law
Institute, 8 LAW & HisT. REv. 55 (1990).
270 See Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'x 2, 4-6
(2000).
271 Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNr.RAcTs at vii, vii
(1981).
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law of any particular state, the Restatements are an excellent resource
for law professors and the compilers of casebooks.
Yet although the Restatements were not meant to be adopted as a
code,272 they have nonetheless had a certain textualizing effect on the
law. There have always been those who viewed the Restatements as
more than just the unofficial "restating" of existing practice. An early
proponent, Elihu Root, proclaimed that "we will have a statement of
the common law of America which will be the prima facie basis on
which judicial action will rest."273 Root's predictions have not been
entirely borne out. There is no "common law of America." But some
courts have begun to explicitly adopt portions of a Restatement. In
doing so, they might intend merely to embrace a principle of law con-
tained in that Restatement. But often enough, they adopt the exact
language of the provision in question. The text, after all, is there for
the taking. Unlike messy judicial opinions, the Restatements contain
carefully-crafted rules.
Thus, just as the legislature can adopt some or all of a uniform
act, judges can adopt sections of a Restatement. It is not unusual to
find statements such as the following in judicial opinions:
"We adopt Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages
§ 8.3 .... ,274
"[W]e adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362 (1965) .... ,275
"We adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments [§] 68 .... ,,276
"We adopt Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 .... -277
Not surprisingly, it appears to be the less populated states (which tend
to have a less fully developed case law) that are particularly inclined to
incorporate provisions of the Restatements into their law. An enthusi-
astic Arizona court has gone so far as to declare that "[this court,
when not bound by previous decisions or legislative enactments, fol-
lows the Restatement of the Law."2 78
272 The founders of the ALI stated that they did not anticipate that the principles
of the restatements would be "adopted as a code." G. Edward White, The American
Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIsT. RFv. 1, 12
(1997) (citing ALI Report, supra note 266, at 23). But see Crystal, supra note 269, at 244
(discussing the code-like form of the Restatements).
273 KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HIsTORY 465 (2d ed. 1996).
274 Krohn v. Sweetheart Props., 52 P.3d 774, 783 (Ariz. 2002).
275 Baker v. Pena, 36 P.3d 602, 604 (Wyo. 2001).
276 Himes v. Maclntyre-Himes (In re Marriage of Himes), 965 P.2d 1087, 1101
(Wash. 1998).
277 Dexter v. Town of Norway, 715 A.2d 169, 172 (Me. 1998),
278 Pilafas v. Ariz. Zoological Soc'y, 836 P.2d 420, 423 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
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In and of itself, adopting the rule of a Restatement does 
not nec-
essarily mean incorporating the exact text of the 
rule, as opposed to
the general principle, into the state's jurisprudence. Moreover, 
the
language of the Restatements is usually at a fairly 
high level of general-
ity. The Restatements do provide more detailed guidance, 
however,
in the form of comments and illustrations. Such 
comments and illus-
trations limit what courts can do with the more 
general language of
the provisions themselves, but even with comments 
the language of
the Restatements is a far cry from the dense and 
detailed language
that is found in the average statute. Even courts 
that incorporate
some or all of a Restatement verbatim thus leave 
themselves a measure
of flexibility. This seems to be what the ALI 
originally intended.
According to Lawrence Friedman, proponents 
of the Restatements
were generally hostile to codification and viewed 
their efforts as
strengthening the common law rather 
than undermining it.
27 9
Nonetheless, it seems to be hard to resist viewing 
the provisions
of the Restatements, once they are formally adopted 
by a state's
courts, in a relatively textual way. Some commentators 
have suggested
that recent Restatements, unlike the earlier ones, 
are more statute-
like.280 Likewise, Sidney DeLong has observed 
that in applying the
famous Section 90 of the Second Restatement 
of Contracts, which
deals with promissory estoppel and which has been 
adopted by many
states, courts follow the rule without reference 
to its rationale. In his
view, "[in] ost courts are inclined to treat Restatement sections 
as they
would statutes, once they have been adopted for that 
jurisdiction. 2 8 '
Randy Barnett has made a similar point:
Courts are increasingly treating the Restatement as a 
statute. Judges
typically look to the Restatement, rather than to even 
very practical
and accessible legal scholarship, to ascertain the prevailing 
contract
doctrine.... Thus, though the Restatement undoubtedly 
hastened
the improvement of contract doctrine in some areas, 
it has also
served to stultify further improvement.
28 2
279 FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 302.
280 Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commenting 
on "Purpose" in the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 454 (1997) (referencing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF SUREY-
snin & GUARANTY §§ 37, 49, 62 (1996)).
281 Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement 
of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. 
REV. 943, 1000.
282 Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 
518, 527 (1996).
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Or, in the words of Michael Sinclair: "Some people even treat the
Restatements as though they were statutes, parsing them as if they had
been enacted into law."2 83
The common law is hardly dead, but there is no denying that
substantial areas that were once core elements of the common law
system have been textualized by means of codification, the uniform
act movement, and to a lesser extent, by the development of the
Restatements. Most of those threats have come from the outside. It
turns out that the common law tradition is also under attack from
within. We have seen how American judicial opinions have over time
come to be written in a highly authoritative form by judges them-
selves. We now proceed to consider further developments along these
lines during the latter half of the twentieth century.
E. The Publication Requirement
Recall that in England, with some limitations, unreported (i.e.,
unpublished) decisions can be cited in most courts. The recent
advent of computerized databases in England has made reference to
unreported decisions even easier and, as we observed earlier, has
induced the House of Lords to enact a rule that generally prohibits
citation of an unreported (unpublished) opinion.28 4 In other English
courts, however, virtually any decision made by the higher courts has
the potential of functioning as a precedent.28 5
The concern that the House of Lords had with the advent of com-
puterized databases-that they would be inundated with precedents,
many of questionable value-had already been raised in the United
States at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
centuries. Computers did not exist at the time, but the book publish-
ing industry was at the height of its glory. West Publishing Company,
among others, aggressively marketed reports of cases from through-
out the United States.2 86 The result was that the eighteen published
volumes of American reports in 1810 had grown exponentially to over
8000 volumes a century later.28 7
Lawyers were overwhelmed by precedent and a number of solu-
tions were proposed. One was that publishers should be more selec-
283 Michael B.W. Sinclair, What Is the "R" in "IRAC", 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457,
464 (2003).
284 HOLBORN, supra note 27, at 175.
285 See supra Part I.D.
286 ThomasJ. Young, A Look at American Law Reporting in the 19th Century, 68 LAw
LIBR. J. 294, 302 (1975).
287 FRIEDMAN, supra note 176, at 475 (citing CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BAR 557 (1911)).
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tive in what they printed. Another possibility was to have 
a committee
of the bar sift through decisions and decide which 
merited publica-
tion. Legislation was also considered. None of 
these proposals was
seriously implemented, however.
28 8 Consequently, appellate judges
kept on handing opinions to the printers (usually via the reporter 
of
decisions or the court clerk), who were only too happy to have 
more
material to print and sell.
Eventually, many jurisdictions came to address the problem by
enacting rules that effectively declare that only certain 
appellate cases
can function as precedents.
2 9 Generally, these rules state that a case
must have been published (usually in an official report) before 
it can
be cited in court. Unpublished opinions have no 
precedential value,
although in some jurisdictions they may be considered as "persuasive
authority.1290 As opposed to the English practice, 
it is usually the
appellate courts themselves that decide which cases 
merit publica-
tion-and thus function as precedents-in the United 
States.29' Typi-
cally, courts are said to "certify" a case for publication, 
or they simply
order that it be published.
292
The guidelines for publication usually specify that 
a case must
present an important constitutional issue or an issue 
of first impres-
sion, or that it must establish new precedent or modify 
existing prece-
dent.293 Some states, like California, add that a case 
should also be
certified for publication if it involves a legal issue of continuing 
public
interest or "makes a significant contribution 
to the legal literature. 
29 4
The converse is that opinions in cases that do not 
raise important or
novel questions, and are therefore of interest mainly 
to the parties
themselves, should not be published.
295
288 Young, supra note 286, at 301-05.
289 Surrency, supra note 62, at 64-65.
290 See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under 
Siege: A Battlefield Report and
Analysis, 5J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 473, 489 
n.1 7 (2003).
291 Surrency, supra note 62, at 65 (tracing the rule to a decision 
made by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1973).
292 See generally Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, 
Constitutionality of "No-Cita-
tion" Rules, 3J. App. PRc. & PRoCEss 287 (2001) and RobertJ. Martineau, 
Restrictions
on Publication and Citation offudicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM
119 (1994) for the history of such rules.
293 See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); MoNr. Sup. CaT. INTERNAL Op. 
R. § I(3)(c). For
additional examples see Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. 
Cranford, Federal and State Court
Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. PRuc. 
& PROCESS 251,
253-85 (2001).
294 CAL. R. CT. 976(b)(4).
295 See State v. Gonzales, 794 P.2d 361, 370-71 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1990).
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Many jurisdictions that limit publication also mandate that
unpublished cases should not be cited in court. Thus, Kentucky's
rules provide that "(oipinions that are not to be published shall not
be cited or used as authority in any other case in any court of this
state."
296
The rules of practice before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
may provide the most detailed statement of these rules and their
justification:
Opinions shall be published in the official reports and on the
Oklahoma Supreme Court World Wide Web site only when they sat-
isfy the standards set out in this rule. Disposition by memorandum,
without a formal published opinion, does not mean that the case is
considered unimportant. It does mean that no new points of law
making the decision of value as precedent are believed to be
involved. A memorandum opinion shall not be published unless it is
ordered to be published by the Supreme Court ....
All memorandum opinions, unless otherwise required to be
published, shall be marked: "Not for Official Publication." Because
unpublished opinions are deemed to be without value as precedent
and are not uniformly available to all parties, opinions so marked
shall not be considered as precedent by any court or cited in any
brief or other material presented to any court, except to support a
claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. Opin-
ions marked Not for Official Publication shall not be published in
the unofficial reporter, nor on the Supreme Court World Wide Web
site, nor in the official reporter.2 97
California may have the nation's strictest publication require-
ments. As in many other jurisdictions, only published cases can func-
tion as precedents, and counsel must not cite to unpublished
opinions.298 In addition, however, the powers of the appellate courts
to regulate publication are extensive. For example, a court may cer-
tify only part of an opinion for publication. 299 Most controversially,
the state's supreme court has the power to "depublish" an opinion
that a lower court certified as being worthy of publication.3 0 0 The
296 KY. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c); see alsoWAss. R. APP. P. 10.4(h) (stating that unpub-
lished opinions of the court of appeals may not be cited as authority). Most no-cita-
tion jurisdictions have an exception, allowing citation to cases "when relevant under
the doctrine of law of the case, resjudicata, and collateral estoppel." See, e.g., 9TH CR.
R. 36-3(a).
297 OKLA. Sup. CT. R. 1.200(b) (internal numbering omitted).
298 CAL. R. CT. 977(a). The customary exceptions regarding related cases apply.
R. 977(b).
299 CAL. R. CT. 976.1(a).
300 CAL. R. CT. 979.
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lower court's disposition stands, but its opinion does not become a
precedent that could cause mischief in other cases. 30'
The depublication process, although not widespread, nonethe-
less shows how critical the text of an opinion has become. Because
the process does not affect the outcome of the case, the only reason to
depublish a case is that the state supreme court disagrees with some or
all of the text of the lower court's opinion. 30 2 The process emphasizes
that in the United States, it is the text of the opinion, not how the case
was decided, that constitutes its precedential value.
Not all American jurisdictions are so devoted to the published
word. Some allow citation to unpublished cases if there is no reported
case on point. Thus, several of the federal circuits, while declaring
that citation to unpublished cases is "disfavored," nonetheless permit
it if counsel believes that an unpublished opinion has precedential or
persuasive value regarding a material issue in a case and that no pub-
lished opinion would serve as well.303 Several state courts likewise
allow the citation of unpublished dispositions as "persuasive"
authority.30 4
We will revisit the publication requirement, which has recently
become hotly contested, at the end of this Part. For now, the critical
point is that in the past, all judicial opinions by appellate courts
counted as precedents, although the precedential value (or authority)
of any opinion could vary.305 An old unreported decision would have
relatively little precedential force, while a recent unanimous supreme
court opinion would have a great deal. In jurisdictions that have
adopted limited publication rules, however, the concept of precedent
has turned into a binary opposition. A decision may or may not func-
tion as a precedent that binds later courts, depending on whether it
was certified for publication.
A precedent is thus no longer any preceding opinion. Rather, it
is a written decision that has been authoritatively selected for publica-
tion, which is the only way that it can achieve full precedential value.
301 SeeJoseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72
CAL. L. REV. 514, 521-22 (1984). Arizona has a similar rule. Michael A. Berch, Analy-
sis of Arizona's Depublication Rule and Practice, 32 Amz. ST. L.J. 175, 186-90 (2000).
302 Grodin, supa note 301, at 522, notes that the practice is most often used when
the court believes that the result in the lower court was correct, but where the reason-
ing of the opinion is felt to be wrong or misleading.
303 See, e.g., 4T CIR. R. 36(c); 6TH Cm. R. 28(g).
304 See, e.g., Yellow Book of NY L.P. v. Dimilia, 729 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288-89 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 2001); Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
305 See supra Part II.A.
1246 (VOL.. 82:3
2007] THE TEXTUALIZATION OF PRECEDENT 
L~ql
It should be clear that this change has the 
potential to promote a
more textual conception of the nature of precedent.
F. Precedent as Text
The end result of these two centuries of 
development in the
United States is that what an appellate judge says-for 
example, dur-
ing or after oral argument-is completely irrelevant. 
What matters,
for legal purposes, is what judges write in their opinions. 
Because the
text comes straight from the horse's mouth, 
so to speak, lawyers focus
intently on the judges' exact words. The practice of 
having a single
majority opinion, when possible, imbues the text of the opinion 
with
further power, since is it normally no longer 
necessary to extract a
ratio decidendi from two or more opinions 
that reach the same result
but differ in their reasoning.
These developments are leading to a different 
conceptualization
of precedent, a notion that is at the core of 
the common law. In this
context it is instructive to consider that what 
we in the United States
call a judicial "opinion" is generally known in England 
as a "judg-
ment." In the older common law, the precedential 
value of a case lay
in its outcome, or judgment. As we have seen, it is still 
theoretically
possible in the English system to have a case 
operate as a precedent
without any judge expressing an opinion.
In the United States, on the other hand, most 
lawyers have come
to think of a precedent as something to be 
found in the text of a
majority opinion. In fact, for many American lawyers the 
text of the
majority opinion seems to have become synonymous with 
the notion
of precedent. The outcome of the case is 
almost an afterthought,
something that matters only to the parties.
Precedent, in other words, is being textualized. 
Today, the
notion that the common law is lex non scripta 
would seem downright
silly to most American lawyers. Not only have 
large areas of the com-
mon law been codified or authoritatively restated, 
but the sources in
which the common law is to be found-judicial opinions-are 
becom-
ing quintessentially lex scripta. The language 
of opinions is increas-
ingly being viewed as authoritative text, not 
all that different from
statutes.
11. CREEPING TEXTUALIZATION
It should be evident by now that current American 
opinions are
very much "written" law and that, in determining 
the holding or ratio
decidendi of a case, there is substantial emphasis 
on the court's exact
words. Half a century ago there were still prominent 
American legal
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scholars, like Roscoe Pound, who could insist that the language of
judicial opinions was not authoritative, but that it is the result that
counts . 0 6 Likewise, Edward Levi's influential book on legal reasoning
stated that where case law is concerned, the judge "is not bound by
the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the
controlling case. ' 30 7 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks could still seriously
maintain, in their influential teaching materials on the legal process,
that the common law was "unwritten."308 They likewise concluded
that the ratio decidendi of a case "is not imprisoned in any single set
of words" and that it therefore "has a flexibility which the statute does
not have. ' '3 0 1 Yet even as these scholars were writing, the ground
beneath them was starting to shift. The language of judicial opinions
was, and still is, becoming ever more textual.
What was once aptly described as a "case law" regime is well on its
way to becoming an "opinion law" system. In other words, the prece-
dential value of a case is nowadays determined not so much by analysis
of the facts, the issue, and the outcome, but by careful scrutiny of the
words written in the opinion. Especially noteworthy is that American
courts are beginning to state their holdings explicitly, and that those
statements of the holding are being treated more and more like a
statute. Judicial opinions-or at least, the part that we regard as pre-
cedent or the holding-are gradually being textualized. The process
is only in its infancy, so it is now a good time to stand back and to
ponder its implications. As will become clear, however, the growing
number of lawyers in the United States, the increasing complexity of
the law, and the advent of electronic publication will almost certainly
intensify this trend.
A. Explicit Statements of the Holding
One sign of the gradual textualization of case law in the United
States is the growing tendency of courts to explicitly state the case's
holding, or the ratio decidendi, in their own words. Recall that in the
English and older American practice, finding the ratio could be a
daunting task that often required sophisticated legal reasoning.3 1 0
Courts certainly did not lay it out on a platter for easy consumption.
306 Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis ?, 10 FoRDAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1941).
307 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949).
308 HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 341 (William M. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds. 1994).
309 Id. at 126.
310 See supra Parts I.D. & II.A.
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Instead, lawyers had to figure out the holding 
by analyzing the rela-
tionship of the facts to the outcome of the case while 
at the same time
reconciling two or three opinions explaining in 
somewhat different
terms why the court had decided as it did. If lawyers 
were lucky, a
particularly able reporter would have added a 
headnote to the case
with a good synopsis or analysis of the holding. 
In fact, even today
headnotes often start with the word "Held," signaling 
that this was pre-
cisely their function.
Traditionally, the verb "hold" in the context of a 
judicial decision
was purely descriptive. The verb was almost always 
in the past tense.
Lawyers or a reporter might have to determine what 
a court held in a
particular case (as in, "the court held..."). Likewise, judges 
might
need to figure out what other judges held in an earlier case 
(as in,
"the Supreme Court held. . .").
What one does not often encounter in older cases 
is judges using
the verb "hold" in a performative sense, where the verb is in 
the first
person, present tense (as in, "we therefore hold . .
.") followed by a
specific principle or rule of law. When using 
such language, a court
performs the act of holding, rather than just describing what 
another
court did in the past.3
11
An overview of the U.S. Supreme Court cases 
decided in 1850
reveals that the phrase "we hold" is relatively 
rare, occurring only
seven times. 3 12 In a majority of cases, the phrase is found in 
the argu-
ment of counsel or in the statement of facts.
313 Only two cases from
1850 employ the phrase in the body of the opinion. 
In the first, the
court notes simply that "we hold there was no error,"
314 which is a legal
conclusion rather than a proposition of law. In the 
other example,
the court uses the phrase to limit its 
holding: "All we hold is .. .,,15
Finally, there is a single occurrence of the phrase 
"this court holds,"
311 Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEXAS 
L. REv. 303, 312-14
(1987).
312 Westlaw search conducted on December 
19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the 
search string "we" +2 "hold"
& "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
313 United States v. Mayor of Phila., 52 U.S. 
(11 How.) 609, 636 (1850); United
States v. Girault, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 22, 27 (1850); Wash., 
Alexandria, & Georgetown
Steam Packet Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 419, 427 (1850); 
Henderson v. Tennessee, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 311, 322 (1850).
314 Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 348, 376 (1850) 
(emphasis added). On the
same page the Court observes: "That the lands 
of the deceased debtor could be seized
and sold under the judgment according to the then laws of 
the state of Missouri, we
hold to be free from doubt .... Id. (emphasis added).
315 Greely v. Thompson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 225, 239 
(1850) (emphasis added).
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which is equivalent to "we hold" but it occurs in a headnote rather
than in the opinion proper.316
In contrast, the past tense "held" occurs no less that sixty-six times
in Supreme Court cases decided during 1850.317 Some of these occur-
rences do not describe the holding of a previous case (as in "the land
was held by so-and-so"). But there are a large number of instances
where "held" is used to describe a previous court's ruling on a pro-
position of law. As might be expected, the word very often appears in
the headnotes or case summary:
The emigration of the Cherokee Nation to the west of the Mis-
sissippi was conducted by their own agents, the chief of whom
received from the United States large sums of money to defray the
expenses thereof, including an estimate for wagon hire. Held, that a
citizen of the Cherokee Nation, supplying wagons under contract
with the chief agent, could not maintain an action against him for
their hire.318
During oral argument, lawyers also frequently used the phrase to
describe a precedent that they believed to be relevant: "But the Cir-
cuit Court treated the defendant as the head or executive of a foreign
and independent nation, and held that, having received the money as
such, he was responsible only to the nation, and could not, jure gen-
tium, be personally liable."3 19
Likewise, the Court itself used the term to describe various prece-
dents by other courts, as well as its own previous holdings: "In the case
of Woodruff v. Trapnal4 decided at the present term, this court held
that the twenty-eighth section in the charter constituted a contract
between the state and the holder of the bills of the bank."3 20 In fact,
the phrase "this court held" occurred nine times in the cases decided
in 1850, all of them describing a previous holding by the Court.321
When the Court expressed its views on a proposition of law dur-
ing this period, or reached a conclusion on the basis of a legal princi-
316 Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. v. Maryland, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 376, 377
(1850). Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme
Court Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "this
court" +2 "holds" & "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
317 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "held" &
"da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
318 Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 363 (1850).
319 Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
320 Paup v. Drew, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 218, 222 (1850) (emphasis added).
321 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "this court" +2
"held" & "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
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ple, it generally used words or phrases such as "we are of the opinion"
or "it is our opinion." Thus, the Court observed that "we are of opin-
ion, that the Surveyor-General had no authority to change the loca-
tion of the grant, and to split up the surveys, as was done in this
instance." 322 A search for the words "we are of the opinion" and
related expressions revealed that such phrases occurred in twenty-
three cases in 1850 Supreme Court cases. 323 Another common
expression was the phrase "our opinion," as in "our opinion is, that if
more had been required than the open and notorious adverse posses-
sion and occupation of the premises, and the court had given an
instruction in general terms as above set forth, it would be errone-
ous."32 4 This phraseology occurred thirteen times during 1850.325
Also quite popular was the phrase "we think," as in: "After full consid-
eration, we think that the time of procurement was the proper time
for appraising the value, and it seems to us to have been stated in the
instruction in conformity with both the express language of several
acts of Congress, and the reason of the case."3 26 This phrase is found
in thirty-four cases decided during 1850.327
Clearly, language referring to the mental state of the justices was
vastly more common than the phrase "we hold." It is easy to make too
much of such distinctions, of course. Judges may become accustomed
to a particular style just because they heard or read their predecessors
using the same terminology. But it is nonetheless revealing that in the
middle of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court's justices
strongly favored terms that reflected their mental state, which is con-
sistent with a view of the common law as being more conceptual than
textual. In fact, the very phrase 'judicial opinion" suggests that it is a
court's thinking that matters.
Fifty years later, in cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1900,
the words "we hold" had become considerably more common, occur-
322 Villalobos v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 541, 555 (1850).
323 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "we" +5 "opin-
ion" & "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
324 Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 348, 375 (1850).
325 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "our opinion"
& "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
326 Greely v. Thompson, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 225, 235 (1850).
327 Wesdlaw search conducted on December 19,2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "we" +3 "think"
& "da(aft 01/01/1850)" & "da(bef 12/31/1850)."
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ring in twenty-eight cases.3 28 Most of the examples do not involve
declaring an elaborate rule of law, however. An illustration is a case
where the Court concluded with the statement: "In fine, we hold that
the act does not conflict with the 14th amendment in the particulars
named."3 29
By the millennial year 2000, the Supreme Court had become
much bolder in explicitly declaring textual holdings. The phrase "we
hold" (sometimes separated by an adverb like "now" or "therefore")
occurred in forty-six cases decided during that year.3 0 In fact, it has
become common practice for the Court to state the holding of the
case (usually prefaced by "we hold" or its close cousin "we conclude")
in either the introductory or concluding paragraph of the majority
opinion. Often enough, as in the 1900 cases, the holding is a rela-
tively straightforward legal conclusion, making it hard to worry too
much about case law being textualized. An example is Dickerson v.
United States,331 where the Court pledged its allegiance to the Miranda
warnings:
We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court,
may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we
decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that
Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and
federal courts.3 32
On other occasions, however, the Court uses the phrase "we
hold" to announce a very rule-like decision that leaves little room for
traditional legal reasoning. An example comes from a 2000 case that
dealt with the writ of habeas corpus and its interaction with recent
legislation:
We are called upon to resolve a series of issues regarding the
law of habeas corpus, including questions of the proper application
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). We hold as follows:
First, when a habeas corpus petitioner seeks to initiate an
appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition after April 24,
328 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases-before 1945" database (SCT-OLD) and using the search string "we" +2 "hold"
& "da(aft 01/01/1900)" & "da(bef 12/31/1900)."
329 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 276 (1900).
330 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006 on the "U.S. Supreme Court
Cases" database (SCT) and using the search string "we" +2 "hold" & "da(aft 01/01/
2000)" & "da(bef 12/31/2000)."
331 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
332 Id. at 432.
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1996 (the effective date of AEDPA), the right to appeal is governed
by the certificate of appealability (COA) requirements now found at
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1994 ed., Supp. Il). This is true whether the
habeas corpus petition was filed in the district court before or after
AEDPA's effective date.
Second, when the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying
constitutional claim, a COA should issue (and an appeal of the dis-
trict court's order may be taken) if the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was cor-
rect in its procedural ruling.
Third, a habeas petition which is filed after an initial petition
was dismissed without adjudication on the merits for failure to
exhaust state remedies is not a "second or successive" petition as
that term is understood in the habeas corpus context. Federal
courts do, however, retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or
unnecessary litigation.
333
In this example the Court is laying down the law in a way that is hard
to distinguish from a federal statute or administrative rule. Its obvious
purpose is to establish clear procedures for inferior judges to follow.
Such detailed rules might be expected when the Court fulfills its
role of supervising the federal courts, as is true with habeas corpus
proceedings, where the Court has taken a particularly aggressive role
in attempting to limit the discretion of the federal judiciary. But tex-
tual holdings seem just as common in the far more conceptual area of
constitutional law, where the Court likewise increasingly tends to pro-
nounce rule-like and sometimes quite detailed holdings, as in a discus-
sion about when a lawyer must discuss a possible appeal with a client:
We ... hold that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to
consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to
think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for
example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or
(2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to coun-
sel that he was interested in appealing.334
Not only does the Court here lay out a fairly elaborate holding in
its own authoritative words, but it does so by means of a two-part test.
Every lawyer has become familiar with such tests. One of the best
known is that relating to obscenity. In Miller v. California,33 5 the Court
333 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 477-78 (2000).
334 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000).
335 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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specifically noted that it was undertaking "to formulate standards
more concrete than those in the past. '"3 6 The Court continued:
State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be care-
fully limited .... We now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That
conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as
written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be
limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value.-3 7
Although the Court in Miller did not use the phrase "we hold," it
was consciously setting forth a textual standard that was meant to be
implemented verbatim. The phraseology has indeed been quoted
word for word in hundreds of subsequent cases.3 18
The observation that the Supreme Court has become inclined to
set clear guidelines for lower courts to follow, often via multi-part
tests, is not novel. Robert Nagel has observed the tendency of the
Court during the past few decades to use a "formulaic style" of opin-
ion writing in constitutional cases, a style that makes much use of
"elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or 'prongs' or 'requirements' or
'standards' or 'hurdles.'" 39 He suggests that the elaborateness and
detail of the formulae in constitutional cases is "an obvious effort to
achieve control and consistency."3 40 Unlike an earlier era, where
judges were subject to "simple and undefined maxims," modern
courts are bound by "rules that are specific and multiple."341
Frederick Schauer has also addressed the notion that modern
judicial opinions, especially in constitutional cases, "read more like
statutes than like opinions of a court. " 342 Schauer's view is that it is
especially courts lower in the hierarchy that are likely to interpret a
judicial opinion like a statute: "[I]t is not what the Supreme Court
held that matters, but what it said .... [Olne good quote is worth a
336 Id. at 20.
337 Id. at 23-24.
338 Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "All Federal & State
Cases" database (ALLCASES) and using the search string "prurient interest in sex" &
"da(aft 01/01/1973)."
339 Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 Micvi. L. REv. 165, 165 (1985).
340 Id. at 178.
341 Id. at 197.
342 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. Rex,. 1455, 1455 (1995).
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hundred clever analyses of the holding."34 - The language of an opin-
ion therefore "takes on a special significance" in the lower courts and
"operates like a statute."3 4 4 As a consequence, the opinion's language
"will be carefully analyzed, and discussions of why one word rather
than another was used will be common. 13 45
Likewise, Charles Collier has discussed the tendency of lawyers to
view the text of judicial opinions as "direct and authoritative sources
of legal rules" whose language "is studied and analyzed in much the
same way that one would puzzle and agonize over the precise wording
of a statute, a constitution, or a literary work."3 46 He observes that the
language of an opinion "begins to command authority in its own
right, rather than merely as a report on how the decision was reached.
Ultimately, the opinion is viewed as itself an original text or primary
source."347 Although none of these scholars uses the term, they are
essentially describing the effects of textualization.
The academic discussion has concentrated largely on opinions by
the United States Supreme Court that deal with constitutional ques-
tions. But textualization is by no means limited to such cases. Most of
the real case law adjudication in the United States takes place in state
courts. Many of these courts have also begun to textualize their hold-
ings in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court tends to do. An
example is an important torts case from California, Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.,3 48 which explains-right at the beginning-exactly what
the holding will be:
We will hold that the Court of Appeal properly found that
plaintiff's particular Tameny cause of action could not proceed;
plaintiff failed to allege facts showing a violation of a fundamental
public policy. We will also conclude, however, that plaintiff has suf-
ficiently alleged a breach of an "oral" or "implied-in-fact" contract,
and that the statute of frauds does not bar his claim so that he may
pursue his action in this regard. Finally, we will hold that the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing applies to employment contracts
and that breach of the covenant may give rise to contract but not
tort damages.3 4 9
343 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. Cmi. L. REv. 682, 683 (1986) (book
review) (emphasis added).
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 Wis. L.
R Ev. 771, 813-14.
347 Id. at 814.
348 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
349 Id. at 374.
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When a holding is set forth in such a textual form, it 
becomes
much harder for a court lower in the hierarchy to avoid 
it by ignoring
it or distinguishing it in some way. In fact, an appellate 
court itself will
find it difficult to tactfully avoid mentioning an 
embarrassing prece-
dent. In this sense, modern courts resemble legislatures, 
which at one
time could ignore the problem of anachronistic 
statutes by assuming
that they had been forgotten or were practically inaccessible. 
Today,
of course, legislatures tend to explicitly repeal such 
statutes. Likewise,
courts can no longer conveniently forget older decisions, 
nor can they
easily dismiss them by suggesting that the case no 
longer seems to be
valid authority or even that the court disagrees 
with the earlier
holding.
Instead, it is increasingly common for courts to explicitly 
overrule
a previous decision. Thus, the Supreme Court 
stated in two recent
opinions: "To the extent that Meek and Wolman conflict 
with this hold-
ing, we overrule them,"
350 and "[w] e now overrule Evans insofar as it
holds that the Compensation Clause forbids Congress 
to apply a gen-
erally applicable, nondiscriminatory tax to the 
salaries of federal
judges, whether or not they were appointed before enactment 
of the
tax."'351 To the same effect is the use of the phrase 
"we disapprove,"
which is literally an expression of the court's 
state of mind, and is
therefore purely descriptive, but which actually 
has come to have the
same function as "we overrule." For example, 
"[hlaving now had an
opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh 
Amendment issue
after briefing and argument, we disapprove the 
Eleventh Amendment
holdings of [specified] cases to the extent that they are 
inconsistent
with our holding today.
352
A similar phenomenon occurs when higher courts 
review judg-
ments of lower courts. Technically, a higher 
court reverses a lower
court's judgment, it does not reverse the opinion that justifies the 
judg-
ment. A very common way to do so in the past 
was to use language
similar to the following: " [ W] e therefore reverse the decrees of the 
Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and of the 
Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Washington, Northern 
Division, and
remand the case to the Circuit Court for further 
proceedings in accor-
350 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000).
351 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 
(2001).
352 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). For 
some of the many ways in
which modern American courts overrule the 
holdings of previous cases, see Pintip
Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Overrule: Speech 
Act Theory and the Doctrine of Stare
Decisis, 113 YALE L.J. 493 (2003).
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dance with this opinion."353 Implicitly, of course, the lower court's
opinion regarding the law is also called into question. Even today, it
often suffices for a higher court to say nothing more than "we disa-
gree" to overrule a lower court's decision.3 54
Now that courts are expressing more textual holdings, however, it
has become more common to expressly reverse the holding, or part of
the holding, of the lower court. Thus, a court might write: "[W]e
reverse the district court's holding that appellant could only bring her
claims in the court that issued the original discharge order and
remand for the district court's consideration of enforcement of § 524
through § 105," 1 55 or "[w]e reverse the district court's holding that
§ 14-306.1 violates equal protection."35 6 The practice of explicitly
reversing a holding is still relatively rare, but it is fully consistent with
the trend towards textualization.
There thus appears to be a growing tendency of American
courts-the United States Supreme Court is but one example 3-7-to
express the holding or ratio decidendi of a case in an authoritative
fashion that is apparently aimed at laying down a relatively precise
rule for the future. If this is so, it would follow that lower courts will
tend to treat the language in which a precedent is expressed as being
particularly authoritative. As we will now see, this indeed appears to
be the case.
B. Quoting the Holding
How judges write their opinions and establish precedents is just
one side of the coin. The other side is how those who are bound by a
precedent read the opinion that establishes it. In other words, if it is
true that judges are expressing their opinions in a more textual way
these days, does it follow that those reading the opinions are inter-
preting them more textually, and less conceptually?
353 United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 218 (1900) (empha-
sis altered).
354 See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000) ("The Ninth Circuit ruled
that this final section of Anders, even though unnecessary to our holding in that case,
was obligatory upon the States. We disagree.").
355 Bessette v. Avco Fin. Serv., 230 F.3d 439, 446 (1st Cir. 2000).
356 Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2003).
357 For example, California state opinions also show this tendency. A Westlaw
search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the Reported "California Cases"
database (CA-CSR) and using the search string "we" w/2 "hold" & "da(aft 12/31/
2002)" & "da(bef 01/01/2004)" indicated that the phrase "we . . .hold" occurred in
289 cases.
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One way to approach the issue is by examining 
whether and how
judges quote precedential opinions. It is instructive to 
compare
American opinions with those produced by English 
judges. I have
already suggested that the English notion of precedent 
is more con-
ceptual, while the modern American notion, is 
more textual. It turns
out that both English and American judges quote extensively 
from the
language of precedential cases. Yet the style of 
quotation is radically
different.
Any American lawyer who reads a few English 
appellate opinions
will immediately be struck by the lengthy quotations 
they contain,
often set apart in indented paragraphs that 
sometimes extend over
several pages. Recall the case from the English 
Court of Appeal, in
which Judge Aldous refers to a nineteenth-century 
precedent decided
by the multi-judge Court of Exchequer Chamber. Aldous first 
quotes
a paragraph of around eighteen lines of text 
by Judge Erle. Later he
quotes another fifteen lines from Erle's opinion. 
Aldous then recites
twenty-five lines of text from the judgment of Judge Vaughan 
Wil-
liams. It is followed by excerpts of text consisting 
of seven lines,
twenty-one lines, and another twenty-one lines 
from the opinions of
three otherjudges. 3 58 The point, of course, is to try to determine 
the
ratio decidendi of the case, which can only 
be done by reading
lengthy portions of text from the opinions of 
a number of judges who
agreed on the outcome, but for somewhat divergent 
reasons. This is
admittedly a rather extreme case, but it is still 
common practice for
English judges to quote lengthy excerpts from the opinions 
of two or
three judges in trying to ascertain the holding.
In fact, extensive quotations are the norm in England 
even when
a single opinion seems to capture the essence 
of the case. Consider a
judgment of the Court of Appeal discussing Regina v. Gough,
359 a 1993
decision by the House of Lords. "The gist of that 
decision," according
to the Court of Appeal, was contained in "two 
brief extracts from the
leading speech of Lord Goff."
3 60 It then quoted twelve lines of text
(129 words) from Lord Goff's opinion. It was followed 
by a second
quotation from Lord Goff on the same point, 
consisting of twenty-
three lines (276 words) .361
358 Ord v. Upton, [20001 1 All E.R. 193, 200-03 (C.A.); 
see supra text accompany-
ing notes 148-53.
359 [19931 1 A.C. 646 (H.L.).
360 Locabail (UK) Ltd. v. Bayfield Prop. Ltd., (20001 
1 All E.R. 65, 73 (C.A.).
361 Id. at 73-74.
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Compare the English approach to an American case, Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc.,36 2 where the U.S. Supreme Court discussed its own prece-
dents regarding recovery of attorney's fees:
As we explained in Alyeska, these exceptions [to the American rule
against fee shifting] fall into three categories. The first ... allows a
court to award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts
directly benefit others. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-258. Second, a
court may assess attorney's fees as a sanction for the "'willful disobe-
dience of a court order.'" Id., at 258 (quoting Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718, (1967))....
Third, and most relevant here, a court may assess attorney's
fees when a party has "'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons."' Alyeska, supra, at 258-259 (quoting F D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)) .... In this regard, if a court finds "that fraud has been
practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been
defiled," it may assess attorney's fees against the responsible party,
Universal Oil, supra, at 580, as it may when a party "shows bad faith
by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforce-
ment of a court order," Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689, n. 14. The imposition
of sanctions in this instance transcends a court's equitable power
concerning relations between the parties and reaches a court's
inherent power to police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of
"vindicat[ing] judicial authority without resort to the more drastic
sanctions available for contempt of court and mak[ing] the prevail-
ing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy."
Ibid.36 3
This excerpt not only contains quotations within quotations, but the
quoted segments all consist of brief snippets of text, ranging from six
to twenty-eight words,
Short quotations from precedential cases appear to be the rule in
American opinions. A survey of ten modern United States Supreme
Court opinions revealed that the average quotation from other (prec-
edential) cases was around nineteen words long.3 64 In contrast, the
362 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
363 Id. at 45-46 (footnotes and parallel citations omitted).
364 Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991); Litton Fin. Printing Div. v.
NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Toibb v. Rad-
loff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991); Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S.
104 (1991); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991); Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501
U.S. 32 (1991); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991); Deposit Prot. Bd. v. Dalia,
[1994] 2 A.C. 367; Hunt v. Severs, [1994] 2 A.C. 350; Rhone v. Stephens, [1994] 2
A.C. 310; Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. E. Counties Leather plc, [19941 2 A.C. 264;
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average quotation from precedential cases in ten House of Lords
opinions from the same time period contained around seventy-seven
words, about four times as many. Moreover, in the American sample,
only one quotation was over 100 words. In the English sample there
were sixteen quotations consisting of more than 100 words, along with
several over 300 words, and one quotation containing more than 400
words.
It might be argued that the quotation practices of English and
American judges should be considered mainly a matter of style. If so,
it is a stylistic distinction that reveals underlying differences in how the
judges view precedent. The American custom of quoting snippets of
text from the holding of a previous case suggests that the courts are
approaching precedential cases as a type of authoritative text. Ameri-
can judges seem to be looking for "sound bites" that encapsulate some
or all of the holding of a case.
Judges writing the precedents seem increasingly happy to provide
those judicial sound bites. As noted above, they conveniently mark
the textual holding with the prefatory phrase "we hold." The ease
with which a holding can be found is illustrated by a California appel-
late case, where the court described a precedential case as follows:
The Supreme Court held: "In sum, we hold that the instant com-
plaint, seeking the recovery of property seized and wrongfully with-
held by defendants, does not involve a claim for 'money or
damages' within the meaning of section 905, and thus would not fall
within the presentation requirements of sections 911.2 and
945.4."96 5
Judges do not always signal their holdings so clearly, of course,
but there seems to be a strong tendency to codify the rule of the case
in a sentence or two, making it that much easier for lawyers and lower
courts to find. Thus, in Brady v. Maryland,3 66 the Supreme Court
stated its holding as follows: "We now hold that the suppression by the
Attorney Gen. v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1994] 2 A.C. 238; Roebuck v.
Mungovin, (1994] 2 A.C. 224; Birmingham City Council v. H. (a minor), [1994] 2
A.C. 212; Regina v. Preston, [1994] 2 A.C. 130; Racz v. Home Office, [1994] 2 A.C. 45;
Ackman v. Policyholders Prot. Bd., [1993] 3 All E.R. 384. The research was done in
1995. It is based on the first ten cases by the House of Lords in the then most recent
bound volume of the Law Reports, Appeal Cases, which was 1994, Volume 2. I did the
same for the U.S. Supreme Court, choosing the first ten cases in what was then the
most recent bound volume of the United States Reports, Volume 501 (October Term,
1990).
365 TrafficSchoolOnline, Inc. v. Clarke, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 412 (Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Minsky v. City of Los Angeles, 520 P.2d 726, 734 (1974)).
366 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
126o [VOL. 82:3
THE TEXTUALIZATION OF PRECEDENT
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion."3 6 7 Headnote number three in West's Supreme Court reporter
repeated this language virtually verbatim, minus a few definite articles:
"Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of pros-
ecution. 3 68 In many cases, all the headnote editors have to do is to
find the appropriate sentence stating the holding, a task that is vastly
simplified when the court prefaces it with the "we hold" phraseology,
as it did here. Subsequent courts can use the same strategy to deter-
mine what the holding is, as did the Ninth Circuit in a case entitled
Anderson v. Calderon3 69: "In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held
'that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.'"3 70 As opposed to the headnote editor,
the Ninth Circuit left in the definite articles.
A final indication of how the holding of cases is being textualized
is that the rules or standards or tests developed by American courts
are now often named for very brief snippets of authoritative text. In
other words, the test has been named for the text. Consider the
"grievous wrong" standard,3 7 1 the "outcome determinative" test,372 or
the "clear and present danger" rule articulated by Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes in Schenck v. United States.373 Another celebrated
Supreme Court case, United States v. Carolene Products Co.y4 contained
a textual standard, "discrete and insular minorities," in a footnote, 375
367 Id. at 87.
368 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1194 (1963).
369 232 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000).
370 Id. at 1062 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
371 Ruffo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992).
372 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The test is referred to as
such by Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965).
373 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
374 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
375 Id. at 152 n.4 (1938). Note that the use of footnotes is itself an indication of a
literate mode of thinking. With their more oral tradition, English judges virtually
never use them.
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but its obscure location did not hinder it from being quoted and fol-
lowed in literally hundreds of cases. - 76
Even if not intended to do so, textual standards of this sort-
often consisting of no more than two or three words-tend to be
interpreted in a more textual and less conceptual way, as indicated
and encouraged by their enclosure within quotation marks in subse-
quent cases. As Michael Sinclair has observed, referring specifically to
the footnote in Carolene Products that "[1] egal actors in lower decision-
making roles take the reasons and verbal formula of higher courts as
governing . . . following authoritative words, rather than rational
analysis."377
Obviously, the point that I am making can be overstated; there
are many modern cases where American courts do not expressly textu-
alize their holdings. It would be foolhardy for law schools to stop
teaching traditional legal reasoning. But it is true that, in general,
English lawyers and judges concentrate on the concepts and reason-
ing contained in precedents, struggling to figure out what the judges
meant and why they decided the cases as they did. To do so, you need
as much evidence as possible, hence the lengthy quotations. Modern
American judges are looking more closely at the exact words that the
judge wrote in the precedential opinion. They therefore concentrate
on extracting critical excerpts of text that they regard as authoritative.
More and more, American judges are reading cases in a way that
resembles how they read and interpret statutes.
C. The Publication Requirement and the Demand for More Text
A final manifestation of the increasingly textual nature of case law
is a growing, almost insatiable, demand for more precedent. If the
answer to a legal question can be found through close analysis ofjudi-
cial texts, rather than through reasoning by analogy, then it follows
that the more text you have, the better. This is the point of view of
many lawyers, who during the past few years have argued, some quite
forcefully, in favor of allowing the citation of unpublished opinions in
the United States. It brings us back to the issue of the publication and
citation of judicial opinions.
376 A Westlaw search conducted on December 19, 2006, on the "All Cases"
database (ALLCASES) using the search terms "discrete and insular minority" resulted
in 417 cases.
377 Michael B.W. Sinclair, Anastasoff versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of
Denying Precedential Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. Prrr. L. REv. 695, 738-39
(2003).
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Recall that in many American jurisdictions, both state and fed-
eral, only opinions that are certified for publication can function as
binding precedents. I will refer to this as the limited publication rule.
The name of the rule is actually somewhat of a misnomer, because
publication per se is not the issue. The fact that someone may have
published a case does not transform it into a precedent. What matters
is that some court, usually the one that issued the opinion, certified it
for publication or ordered that it be published. The result of the pub-
lication requirement is that it is the judges who decide which of their
cases are legally considered to be precedents.' , 78
A related issue is the legal status of unpublished cases (i.e., those
not certified for publication). In a jurisdiction that holds that such
cases are not binding precedent, do they nonetheless have any weight
in a court of law? In some such jurisdictions, unpublished opinions
do not have binding precedential force, in that they do not establish
general principles of law that must be followed in later cases. I will
refer to this as the no-authority approach. A few jurisdictions allow an
unpublished case to have precedential value when there is no pub-
lished case on the issue. I will refer to this as the limited-authority
approach. In addition, a fair number of state and federal courts con-
sider unpublished cases to be persuasive authority, rather than being
binding precedent. I will refer to this as the persuasive-authority
approach. Recall also that jurisdictions adhering to the no-authority
approach typically forbid any citation to unpublished cases.379 Not
only are such cases deemed irrelevant, but in theory lawyers who vio-
late the no-citation rule are subject to discipline.380
No-citation rules have recently drawn a great deal of opposition.
Some have intimated that the rules raise the specter of "secret law"
that is inaccessible not only to average citizens, but to the legal profes-
sion as well. In fact, no less a figure than Supreme CourtJustice John
Paul Stevens once criticized a federal appellate court for not publish-
ing a case and thereby creating "secret law."38 Abolishing secret law
has become a cause c6lMbre for some lawyers, as well as members of the
public, as indicated by the mission statement of a group (or person?)
calling itself the Committee for the Rule of Law: "The Committee for
378 Remember that in the English system, it is reporters and printers who decide
what to report, something that is sometimes felt to be a weakness in their system. See
supra note 60 and accompanying text, notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 291-303 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2001); Sorchini v.
City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).
381 County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 938 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
2007) 126 3
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the Rule of Law maintains that any rule restricting citation of, or
which allows, secret, hidden, or unpublished opinions encourages
expedient, not careful, consideration as the basis for judgment, and
constitutes an invitation to error, incompetence, corruption and tyr-
anny.' '38 2 Others have intimated that these rules amount to censor-
ship,3 3 or have suggested that they are Kafkaesque or belong in a
totalitarian state. 38 4
While the term "secret law" sounds rather ominous, the fact is
that all judicial opinions, published or not, are matters of public
record and available to the anyone who is seriously interested.3 5
While in the past unpublished opinions may have been hard to find
and obtain, the Internet has made them widely accessible. Moreover,
in states that follow the no-authority approach, unpublished opinions
have no precedential force and are therefore simply not "law" in the
first place.
The real animus behind the "secret law" argument seems to be
that some appellate judges are making decisions without publicly
explaining their reasons. William Reynolds and William Richman,
who conducted a careful study of the impact of limited publication in
the federal courts of appeals during the late 1970s, found that rela-
tively few cases with significant precedential value were not being pub-
lished. 386 After an extensive review of a year's worth of opinions, they
did indeed find a few examples of cases that should probably have
been published, but concluded that overall, there was no widespread
"hiding" of potentially significant precedents. 3 7 They did recom-
382 The Committee for the Rule of Law, Mission Statement, http://www.nonpubli-
cation.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2007). The Committee seems to be largely the work
of one lawyer, Kenneth Schmier, who is at least partly motivated by having lost a
California appeal, brought on his own behalf, that was disposed of via an unpublished
case, and that purportedly caused him to lose $700,000. See Unpublished Judicial Opin-
ions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciay, 107th Cong. 20, 22 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings on Unpub-
lished Decisions] (statement of Kenneth Schmier, Chairman, Comm. for the Rule of
Law).
383 David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 1133 (2002).
384 Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the
Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L.
REv. 235, 249 (1988).
385 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated, 235
F.3d 1054 (2000) (en banc).
386 William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cmi. L. REv. 573, 606-07
(1981).
387 Id. at 608.
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mend, however, that publication standards be broadened 
to include
certain cases that might be of public interest, as 
well as to avoid the
temptation for judges to sweep problems under the rug via an 
opinion
that is essentially off the books."
88
A more serious issue identified by Reynolds and 
Richman is that
in a substantial number of cases, the federal circuit 
courts were dispos-
ing of cases with extremely cursory opinions 
that had so little sub-
stance that they might suggest that judges had not given 
the matter
the attention that it deserved.
389 The solution to this issue, which can
be a very legitimate concern, is to require that 
all appellate decisions
be accompanied by a written justification, even if it is relatively 
brief
and not officially published, explaining the result 
and the reasons for
it. As long as this is provided to the parties, and 
is available as a public
record, there is little danger of our court system 
secretly making tyran-
nical decisions. Any interested reporter can 
obtain a copy of an
unpublished decision and cite it in a newspaper 
or on a website-3 90
The real issue, it seems to me, is not that courts 
are making secret
law. Nor is the controversy really about no-citation 
rules. After all, if a
jurisdiction deems some of its appellate decisions 
without preceden-
tial force, there is no point to citing them. The 
crux of the matter is
that many lawyers simply want more law. They want 
more precedent.
It would be pointless for opponents of no-citation 
rules to argue that
they should be allowed to cite unpublished cases 
unless they had some
precedential force. They are really attacking 
the limited-publication
rule, that is to say, the power that American judges have bestowed 
on
themselves to determine the precedential value 
of their opinions.
The opposition to limited publication raises 
an intriguing possi-
bility. Perhaps allowing unpublished opinions 
to function as prece-
dents can moderate the trend towards the textualization 
of precedent.
After all, they are typically drafted with less care 
than opinions certi-
fied for publication. As a result, they are likely 
to be more speech-like.
Moreover, if American courts allowed citation 
to any opinion, pub-
lished or not, as binding precedent, our system 
would more closely
resemble that of England, where unreported decisions 
have tradition-
ally been citable. Yet as we will see, allowing 
the citation of unpub-
lished opinions will probably only accelerate 
the textualization of
precedent.
388 Id. at 610-11.
389 Id. at 621. For a more somber assessment, 
see David R. Songer et al., Nonpubli-
cation in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical 
Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 975-76
(1989) (concluding that many controversial cases 
are being decided in cases with
unpublished opinions).
390 See Martineau, supra note 292, at 131.
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1. The Evolving Meaning of "Publication"
The rallying point for the movement to allow citation of unpub-
lished opinions is Anastasoff v. United States,391 which we will discuss
below. But the movement was actually precipitated by events a decade
or two earlier, when the major online legal databases, Lexis and
Westlaw, began to make ever more unpublished cases available to law-
yers. The result was that lawyers looking for a good precedent would
find what seemed to be the perfect case, only to discover on closer
examination that it was unpublished. Those who practiced in a
no-citation jurisdiction, and to a lesser extent those in limited-author-
ity or persuasive-authority jurisdictions, would have felt that the rules
deprived them ofjust the case they needed to win a lawsuit. Consider
the analogy to the Garden of Eden, where Adam and Eve had forbid-
den fruit dangling temptingly before their eyes, only to be told by God
that they could not touch it.3 9 2 The online databases dangle the fruit,
but the courts forbid its consumption. Like Eve, many lawyers would
love to eat of the tree of knowledge.
It is worth observing that with the rise of computers and the
Internet, the meaning of publication has changed substantially. Previ-
ously, "unpublished" was effectively a synonym of "unprinted,"
because printing was the only practical means of broadly disseminat-
ing the text of an opinion. Electronic publication has not only made
printed legal materials more widely accessible, but also has published
many materials that would not have been printed in the past. Once
those previously unprinted materials became easily available, it is natu-
ral that some lawyers would want to use them.
2. Anastasoff and the Controversy About Limited Publication
Anastasoff began as a routine tax dispute raising a relatively
straightforward legal issue: whether a taxpayer's claim for a refund
arrived within the statutorily-mandated time if it was received a day
late, even though it was mailed before the deadline.3 93 The district
court decided that the statute referred to when the claim arrived, and
that it was therefore untimely, - 94 Anastasoff appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision.3 9 -
391 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
392 SeeJoshua R. Mandell, Note, Trees that Fall in the Forest: The Precedential Effect of
Unpublished Opinions, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1255, 1294 (2001).
393 Anastasoff 223 F.3d 898.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 899.
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What provoked a great deal of attention from the legal world was
not the court's holding on the minutiae of tax law, but how it reached
its decision. Judge Arnold, who wrote the opinion for a three-judge
panel, held that the court was bound by a previous unpublished Eighth
Circuit case. 396 According to the Eighth Circuit's rules at the time,
unpublished opinions "are not precedent and parties generally should
not cite them," although they can be cited "if the opinion has persua-
sive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or
another court would serve as well." 97 Under this rule, the parties
were free to cite the unpublished case. Thejudges on the panel could
have looked at theprevious case, could have decided that they were
persuaded by it, and could then have written an opinion that tracked
the reasoning of the unpublished case. This they did not do. Rather,
they declared themselves bound by the previous decision, regardless of
whether they agreed with it.391 The reason, according to the panel,
was that the rule giving only persuasive effect to the court's unpub-
lished decisions was unconstitutional. 399
According to Judge Arnold's opinion, Article III of the Constitu-
tion requires that every prior decision by a court, as well as any deci-
sion by a court that is above it in the hierarchy, must be obeyed.400 In
other words, courts do not have the power to declare which of their
opinions are to have binding precedential effect; all of their opinions
must have such force. Thus, "Rule 28A(i) expands the judicial power
beyond the limits set by Article III by allowing us complete discretion
to determine which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not.
Insofar as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the
Rule is therefore unconstitutional."40 1
We can leave the constitutional issues to scholars more compe-
tent to address them, but it is worth examining the court's historical
observations. The Circuit's rule violated Article III, according to
Judge Arnold's opinion, because the framers of the Constitution were
familiar with the doctrine of precedent and therefore implicitly
adopted the common law system of adjudication that was used when
the Constitution was ratified.402 Yet a closer analysis of the history of
the concept of precedent suggests that it would be highly problematic
396 Id.
397 ST Cm. R. 28A(i).
398 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 900.
399 Id.
400 See id.
401 Id. at 905.
402 Id. at 899-900.
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for modern courts to try to replicate conditions that existed over two
hundred years ago, even if they felt obligated to do so. 403
It is probably true that when the Constitution was ratified, any
previous case, published or not, could be cited in American courts.
That did not mean, however, that a single case that was on point
would invariably bind a later court. Certainly in England, judges gave
greater or lesser deference to a precedential decision depending on
factors such as the judge's reputation, how old the case was, the status
of the court, and the quality of the reports in which it appeared.
Moreover, a case could function as an influential precedent even if
there was no opinion at all, as we saw in our discussion of Raffles v.
Wichelhaus.40 4 It is simply not correct that in the late-eighteenth cen-
tury, any previous case was binding authority in the way it is today.40 5
Roughly the same conditions existed in the United States when
the Constitution was adopted. 4 6 Consider the problems posed by
uneven reporting, the delivery of oral seriatim opinions that were pub-
lished without review by the judges who delivered them, a court sys-
tem that had no clear hierarchy, and the notion that the common law
was unwritten and resided in the collective memory of the legal pro-
fession. It seems unlikely that a court would consider itself strictly
bound by a single decision under such circumstances, and even more
unlikely that it would hold itself compelled to follow an unreported
decision. Even if we believe that it matters what the Framers thought,
it is bizarre to suggest that they would have wanted every facet of the
common law system of adjudication to be forever frozen in time. 40 7
Even more significant is that reporting practices of the time effec-
tively created a system that is similar to the limited-publication rules in
most American jurisdictions. Recall that English judges, even today,
deliver oral opinions that might or might not be reported. Whether
to report a case is up to the discretion of the reporter or printer. In
theory, if not always in practice, reporters would generally publish
cases presenting a novel issue of law or making a change in existing
law. 40 8 Although unreported cases could, and to some extent still can,
function as precedents, it is hard to believe that an unreported case
403 See Mandell, supra note 392, at 1276--90.
404 See supra text accompanying notes 132-41.
405 As we have seen, even a century later, when English judges felt themselves
absolutely bound by a single precedent, there were various escape valves that miti-
gated the force of that rule. See supra notes 142-56.
406 On precedent in early America, see Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitu-
tional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 73-91 (2001).
407 See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1162-69 (9th Cir. 2001).
408 See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
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that a barrister claimed to remember would have binding force, in the
way that written precedents currently bind subsequent or inferior
courts. Basically, most unreported decisions in the late-eighteenth
century would have been treated in much the same way that we cur-
rently treat persuasive authority. This historical approach is actually
quite similar to the rule in the Eighth Circuit, which the Anastasoff
court found unconstitutional: published opinions are binding prece-
dent, while unpublished cases can sometimes be cited for their per-
suasive value. The major difference resides in who decides what to
report or publish. When the Constitution was ratified, it was the
reporters who made this decision. Currently it is done in the United
States by judges.
If the concept of precedent became fixed when the Constitution
was ratified, we would have to give back to private reporters the power
to decide which opinions merit publication. And we would also
return to oral seriatim opinion delivery and the notion that judges do
not make law, but merely discover it.409 As Michael Sinclair has
pointed out, the fact that the framers of the Constitution most likely
adhered to the declaratory theory of the common law, which has long
since been abandoned, is highly problematic for any originalist
approach to this issue.410
The Anastasoff case itself soon faded from view. The Internal Rev-
enue Service did the right thing and gave Ms. Anastasoff her refund.
As a result, the case became moot and the opinion was vacated.4 11
Nonetheless, the controversy lives on. The Ninth Circuit, in an opin-
ion by Judge Alex Kozinski, addressed the same issue as that in the
Anastasoff case but came to the opposite conclusion, holding that the
circuit's no-citation rule does not violate Article Il, and expressly con-
cluding that federal judges have the power to decide which cases are
precedential. 41 2
Those who oppose rules that limit citation or that deprive certain
cases of precedential force advance a number of arguments. A practi-
cal concern, as mentioned, is that lawyers feel that they are being
deprived of cases that might benefit their clients. In addition, judges
should be held accountable for the decisions that they make. Because
unpublished opinions are short and sometimes difficult to find,
409 Interestingly, Judge Arnold suggests that the Framers adhered to the declara-
tory theory of adjudication. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.
2000), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (2000) (en banc). For a contrary view, see Hart, 266
F.3d at 1163-64.
410 Sinclair, supra note 377, at 711.
411 Anastasoff 235 F.3d 1055.
412 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1180.
20071 126 9
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
judges may be treating such cases with less careful consideration or
might even be making decisions based on whims rather than the
law.413 And it might be more difficult to obtain review from a higher
court.41 4 Moreover, critics have argued that judges are not particu-
larly good at deciding which opinions have precedential value and
should therefore be published. 415
A particularly interesting criticism is that unpublished opinions
are suspect because they constitute unwritten law. Written law, in con-
trast, is held to function as a check on governmental power. It is a
bastion of freedom that defends us against tyranny.41 6 A somewhat
more nuanced argument along the same lines is made by Reynolds
and Richman, who suggest that "[t] he discipline of providing written
reasons . . .often will show weaknesses or inconsistencies in the
intended decision that may compel a change in the rationale or even
in the ultimate result. '41 7 In an interesting historical about-face, the
legal profession's former glorification of the unwritten nature of the
common law as a bastion against tyranny and legislative meddling has
been turned on its head.
In the opposing camp, advocates for these rules point out that
when an opinion is ordered to be published, and thus becomes prece-
dential, the judge who writes it must take a great deal of time to set
out the facts, and, more importantly, to present the court's disposition
of the case in a way that is comprehensible and legitimate. 418 Not only
must the court consider the case before it, but it must also take into
account how the rules or principles it adopts might be applied to
future cases. The views of other judges who join in the opinion must
also be taken into account. All of this takes a great deal of time and
effort, making it impossible for judges to give such extensive treat-
ment to every case that they decide. In the Ninth Circuit, for instance,
judges write around 150 opinions a year, and they must read hun-
dreds of others. 41 9 It simply is not practical to expect extensive and
carefully-written decisions in so many cases. For this reason, the
413 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 386, at 621.
414 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 282-84
(1996).
415 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 386, at 581.
416 MiltonJ. Silverman, The Unwritten Law: The Unpublished Opinion in California, 51
CAL. ST. B.J. 33, 33-34 (1976).
417 Reynolds & Richman, supra note 386, at 603.
418 Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!: Why We Don't Allow
Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 43.
419 Id.
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judges in that circuit produce published opinions in about twenty per-
cent of all cases, all of which are binding precedent; the rest may not
be cited.420
Because most of these other cases involve routine application of
existing law to the facts, there is felt to be no need to publish them or
to allow lawyers to cite them. In fact, defenders of no-citation rules
argue that permitting opinions in such cases to be cited is not just a
waste of everyone's time, but could also be problematic because the
opinions are simply not drafted with the care that goes into a pub-
lished case. In unpublished cases, according to Judges Kozinski and
Reinhardt, "the result is what matters . . .not the precise wording of
the disposition."421 Consequently, "conscientious judges would have
to pay much closer attention to their precise wording" if lawyers could
cite unpublished dispositions, and that would place an impossible bur-
den on the courts.422
The debate rages on. Congress has recently held hearings on the
issue.423 A few jurisdictions have abolished their no-citation rules.424
And in April of 2004 the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of
the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended the adop-
tion of a rule of appellate procedure that would prohibit federal
courts from placing restrictions on the citation of unpublished or
nonprecedential decisions.425 Rule 32.1 has been approved by the
Supreme Court and will go into effect at the beginning of 2007.426
The new rule does not, however, address what is really at the heart of
the matter: whether judges should be able to decide that only certain
cases or opinions can operate as precedent.
D. Can We Detextualize Precedent?
The arguments for and against the various publication and cita-
tion rules raise an intriguing possibility. Critics would like to be able
to cite all cases. Judges typically respond that it would be too much of
a burden to carefully craft so many opinions, focusing closely on the
precise wording of each one. An obvious solution is to revert to the
420 Id. at 43-44.
421 Id. at 44.
422 Id.
423 See Hearings on Unpublished Decisions, supra note 382.
424 See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 3-7 (2002).
425 Judicial Conference Backs Proposal to Ease Restrictions on Citing Unpublished Opin-
ions, 72 U.S.L.W. 2626, 2626 (2004).
426 Supreme Court Approves Rule Changes on E-Discovery, Unpublished Opinion Citation,
74 U.S.L.W. 2617, 2617 (2006).
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golden age of the common law, before precedent became 
textualized.
Unlike Judge Arnold's proposal in Anastasoff, which mixes the mod-
ern concept of binding and authoritative written 
opinions with the
historic notion that all cases are precedents, a 
more interesting
approach would be to turn the clock back completely 
two or three
hundred years. At that time, all cases were precedents, 
but no one
paid excessive attention to the exact wording of opinions. 
Reports did
not consist of opinions written by the judges themselves, but 
were
summaries made by a private reporter of oral 
proceedings in court.
Unreported decisions had no written text at 
all, making it highly
unlikely that a judge or lawyer who remembered a case decided 
ten
years before, and who wished to use it as a precedent, 
would have
been able to remember anything beyond the 
outcome and the gen-
eral gist of what the judges had said. Books of printed reports 
were an
important tool, but did not constitute the common 
law. The common
law truly was unwritten in the sense that its essence 
resided in the
minds of judges and lawyers.
427
While turning back the clock might seem like a mind 
game or an
antiquarian fantasy, some participants in the controversy 
surrounding
no-citation rules have in fact made proposals 
that, if successfully
implemented, have the potential to reverse the 
gradual textualization
of precedent that has been taking place during 
the past two or more
centuries. For example, David Greenwald and 
Frederick Schwarz
have argued, based largely on free-speech grounds, 
that all appellate
opinions should be citable.
428 Recognizing that this would place a
severe burden on federal appellate judges, and that an expansion 
of
the size of the judiciary is not likely, they suggest allowing appellate
courts to dispose of routine cases by delivering 
oral judgments, as in
England. 429 These opinions would be recorded 
and perhaps tran-
scribed, not just for the benefit of the parties, but also for anyone 
else
who might wish to cite the opinion.
430 The proposal would have the
advantage of giving judges a relatively easy way of publicly presenting
the reasons for a decision, thus avoiding the specter 
of "secret law."
The critical point from our perspective is that 
spoken delivery, espe-
cially if done directly following oral argument, 
would necessarily pro-
duce less textual opinions.
43 1 Lawyers would be unlikely to focus
427 See supra Part I.
428 Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 383, at 1133-34.
429 Id. at 1134.
430 Id. at 1169-70.
431 The authors also recognize that because 
of the informal nature of these opin-
ions, they would generally constitute less forceful 
precedents than their written coun-
terparts. Id. at 1170. For a similar proposal, see 
Richard B. Cappalli, The Common
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intensely on the words of such an opinion, since it would have been
delivered without the extensive planning, editing, and revision that is
common with published decisions.
A more interesting and radical proposal is to deconstruct the cur-
rent notion of precedent entirely, particularly the bright-line distinc-
tion that American lawyers and judges tend to draw between
precedential and nonprecedential opinions. Stephen Barnett, for
example, has suggested that there are five varieties of precedent: bind-
ing precedent, overrulable precedent, "precedential value," persuasive
value, and citable precedent. 432 This categorization eliminates the
strict dichotomy between precedential and nonprecedential opinions.
If we follow these ideas to their logical conclusion, the notion of
precedent could return to its origins by referring to any preceding
opinion. Judges who deliver an opinion would no longer be able to
decide whether it should be binding. The precedential value of their
decision would be made by later judges who are called upon to apply
it in a subsequent case.
What would gain prominence under such a system are the things
that arguably should matter: the quality of the lawyers and arguments
before the court; the training, experience, and prominence of the
judges on a particular panel; the thoroughness of the judges' research
and the persuasiveness of their reasoning. An opinion that scores
highly on such criteria would have great precedential force and would
be impossible to ignore. One that scores lower would have less influ-
ence on a later court's decision. Of course, if courts are in a hierar-
chical relationship, it would generally be prudent for lower courts to
follow even those opinions that they do not find particularly persua-
sive, because the higher court can and probably will use its power to
reverse a decision with which it does not agree. But later panels of the
same court would have much more flexibility than they now have to
avoid a badly-reasoned precedent.
Moreover, eliminating the dichotomy between cases that are
precedential and those that are not would reduce the almost inevita-
ble pressures to textualize the common law. When a court declares
that a case is precedential (i.e., certifies it for publication), those who
read the case are aware that a great deal of effort has gone into draft-
ing the exact words of the text, and that most likely all the judges who
sign the opinion have reviewed that text carefully. In essence, a
Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CA.. L. REv. 755 (2003) (suggesting
that those cases that currently result in an unpublished opinion should instead be
resolved by short opinions that can be treated as precedential).
432 Barnett, supra note 424, at 9-12.
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majority of the judges have voted to "enact" that exact text as the 
opin-
ion of the court, not unlike a legislature enacting 
a statute.
Because there is a symbiotic relationship between 
encoding and
decoding a text, those who interpret a text that has 
been meticulously
drafted will tend to decode or interpret it with 
similar meticulous-
ness.433 They will, in other words, almost inevitably 
focus closely on
the exact words of the opinion. In that sense, rules 
relating to limited
publication and citation, which have made the 
texts of published
opinions highly authoritative, have clearly promoted 
the textualiza-
tion of precedent, as also observed by Richard 
Cappalli. 434 Eliminat-
ing those rules is probably the most practical 
way of reversing the
trend. Another possibility might be a rule of appellate 
procedure that
prohibits judges from expressing overly textual holdings, but it 
is hard
to imagine that such a rule would be adopted. 
In contrast, proposals
to eliminate the no-citation rule have already 
been made and
adopted, and a companion provision depriving judges of the power 
to
declare which cases are precedential would be easy 
to add.
Of course, the judiciary has a great deal of influence over the
rules that govern courts and procedures. Even 
the relatively modest
proposal to allow lawyers to cite unpublished opinions, 
without mak-
ing any change to the status of those cases, has 
encountered serious
opposition from the bench.
433 While it is possible that surviving
no-citation rules (still common in many states) will be eliminated, 
it
seems unlikely that judges will relinquish their ability to declare 
that
some opinions are precedential and binding, and 
that others are not.
Beyond these practical considerations, there are 
reasons to sus-
pect that, in light of changes in society and the legal 
system, and espe-
cially because of current technology, a return to an 
earlier state where
all cases are precedential will not really serve to 
detextualize common
law adjudication. At first this conclusion might seem counterintuitive.
Modern innovations like e-mail and websites have 
in many ways made
the processes of communication and publication 
far less textual and
more oral than before. Our e-mails, typically dashed 
off quickly, are
far more speech-like than letters were in the past. 
Websites allow vir-
tually everyone to publish his or her views on just about any topic,
433 Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, 
Autonomy and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 76 TUL. L. REv. 431, 449-50 (2001).
434 Cappalli, supra note 431, at 775 (arguing that under 
a limited-publication
approach, as defended by Judge Kozinski, "a precedent 
controls not through its ideas,
but through its verbal expression").
435 The proposal to eliminate the no-citation rule 
on the federal level was immedi-
ately controversial. See Judicial Conference Rules Committee Agrees 
to Propose New E-Discov-
ery Rules, 72 U.S.L.W. 2766, 2767 (2004).
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usually without the selectiveness and editorial oversight that 
were
common in the print media. Electronic communication and 
publica-
tion tends to be relatively less formal and considerably 
more speech-
like than written communication and printed 
publication was in the
past. 436
In other ways, however, new technology is likely 
to promote a
more textual approach to the common law. Consider 
that if you send
an e-mail to a friend or acquaintance, you can 
often dispose of a mat-
ter with a few quick informal sentences. Spelling 
errors may not nec-
essarily be corrected, and formal words of salutation 
and a signature
may not be necessary. But if you send a similar e-mail 
to a large group
of people, or to someone whom you do not know, 
you will compose it
with greater care. It will more closely resemble 
a traditional letter.
Thus, judges are not being disingenuous when they claim 
that the
elimination of no-citation rules will force them 
to spend more time
drafting opinions which were formerly unpublished. 
If an opinion is
written not just for the parties, as is currently the case with 
unpub-
lished dispositions, but is instead likely to be read 
and cited by a much
broader audience, judges will inevitably spend more time in 
drafting
it. Such opinions will not be as informal as 
they now are, but will
come to have the look and feel of the published 
opinions that popu-
late the bound reports. Once they are drafted 
with more attention
paid to text, they will tend to be interpreted correspondingly, 
i.e., in a
more textual way. Perhaps judges and lawyers can resist these 
tempta-
tions, but history is not encouraging.
Moreover, the legal profession has changed 
dramatically since
the days when all opinions were precedents. We 
have seen that at one
time it was not a wild exaggeration to suggest 
that the common law
resided in the minds of the legal profession, rather 
than in the texts of
published reports. Until relatively recently, the 
number of English
barristers numbered in the hundreds and there 
were perhaps a dozen
royal judges before whom they practiced. The judges and lawyers 
reg-
ularly met at the inns of court, where they 
debated how to resolve
difficult legal issues.
437 The situation in early America was not all 
that
different.
As the number of courts, judges, and lawyers grew, especially 
in
the United States, and as the legal profession left 
the proximity of the
courts and dispersed throughout the country, 
the notion of the com-
436 See generally NAOMI S. BARON, ALPHABET TO 
EMAIL 188-89 (2000) (arguing that
writing has increasingly come to mirror speech 
as various technologies, from televi-
sion to cell phones, have undercut traditional written 
forms).
437 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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mon law being common knowledge in the profession rapidly became
a myth. Access to accurate written texts of opinions was now essential,
and various reporters and publishing houses supplied the ever-
increasing demand. At this point, it would be fair to say that the com-
mon law resided in published reports. The adoption of limited publi-
cation rules only buttressed a conclusion that had already become a
practical inevitability. The printed books of reports had not merely
become essential to the practice of the common law; they were the
common law.
During the past decade or two, the growth of online legal
databases of case reports has begun to undermine the supremacy of
print. As the volume of cases continues to expand, online databases
will grow ever more essential. If no-citation rules are eliminated, elec-
tronic databases will be the only game in town.438 At that point, the
common law will reside in the memory banks of computers.
As case law is increasingly stored in machine-readable format, the
way in which lawyers and judges research it has begun to change. The
most practical way to access such a large database is by searching for
collocations of text. Natural language searching, although the idea
sounds appealing, cannot really locate concepts. For now, at least, any
search algorithm must in some way or other concentrate on strings of
words. There is currently no way of escaping text.
Paradoxically, even though computers reduce everything to a
binary code, and therefore do not store text as such, the digitization
of the law is likely to make the common law even more textual than it
was before. When the law was contained in books of reports, there
was no way to search for specific words or strings of text. A lawyer who
wished to research an issue generally had to access case law by means
of a digest, a legal encyclopedia, or perhaps a treatise. All of these
tools result from human mediation and analysis. Also important is
that they are organized conceptually. If you wish to use traditional
research tools to find out whether in your jurisdiction a person can
get a prescriptive easement against a water district, you will have to
consult a treatise on property law, or look at a digest or legal encyclo-
pedia under "property" or "easement" or a related topic until you find
the information you seek.
Critically, all of those research tools were compiled by human
beings with legal training. In addition, each of these resources (espe-
cially legal encyclopedias and treatises) provides a great deal of con-
text. The lawyer doing the research can easily place his search into
438 See Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1701-03 (2000).
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the more general context of easements, or easements against a gov-
ernmental agency. Finally, once the lawyer finds some potentially rel-
evant cases, he will have to look them up in books, so that he has the
entire case before him, starting with the first page. He might not read
it all, but he would at least skim it, thus giving him some notion of the
context in which the case was decided.
I suspect that today, a lawyer doing similar research will access an
online database and conduct a search for the term "prescriptive ease-
ment" within a few words or within the same paragraph as "water dis-
trict." The database's search engine would take her straight to the
relevant paragraph of an opinion. Although digests, treatises, and
tools like the West key numbering system remain available, lawyers-
especially younger lawyers who have limited experience with books-
tend to do the majority of their research by searching for text. We
have already seen that the traditional analysis of the holding or ratio
decidendi of a case is being replaced by searching for and reading
snippets of critical text. Clearly, the capability and convenience of
doing textual searches can only promote that trend. In fact, if we
treat all appellate decisions as precedent, vastly increasing the bulk of
decisional law, textual searches may become the only practical way to
conduct research. 43 9 As Robert Berring has observed, it will become
far too costly for traditional resources to keep up with such a mass of
case law.4
40
The transfer of the common law from books of reports to online
databases is almost certainly unstoppable. The information age is
upon us. It does not mean, however, that all information is equal. We
all know that some of the information we obtain on the Internet is of
high quality and very reliable, while much other information is at best
worthless and at worst false, deceptive, or mendacious. In between
those extremes is a vast amount of information whose usefulness and
truth is difficult to determine.
Traditional publishers have generally performed a gatekeeping
function with respect to information flow. Academic publishers sub-
ject proposed books and articles to peer review. Commercial printing
houses are probably in some ways less rigorous in evaluating the qual-
ity and accuracy of the material they publish, but even they need to be
concerned about their reputations and the reaction of the market-
439 Frederick Schauer has noted that just as lawyers read only part of a statute,
modern online sources make it easy to find and readjust part of an opinion. Schauer,
supra note 342, at 1471-72,
440 Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe, 69 WASH.
L. REv. 9, 27 (1994),
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place. In both settings, editors work with authors to guarantee a cer-
tain level of professionalism.
The Internet has made it possible to avoid the gatekeepers. Vir-
tually anyone can be a publisher, at minimal cost, by posting material
on a website or by emailing it to hundreds or thousands of recipients.
Much of it is junk, of course, or otherwise irrelevant. So far, nothing
in cyberspace fulfills the gatekeeping function traditionally performed
by publication.
The relevance of these concerns to the notion of precedent
should be evident. Maybe it's not such a bad idea to have someone
sift through the masses of decisions and tell us which of them were
carefully drafted after careful consideration of the facts in the case
and the implications that the decision might have in the future. At
some point, it might have been debatable whether reporters or judges
should be making that gatekeeping decision, but currently judges
seem to be the only viable option. In any event, it seems that judges
are generally in the best position to decide which of their cases have
received the sort of care and consideration that would qualify them as
precedential.
CONCLUSION
Although American courts use a common-law system of adjudica-
tion in which precedent is a source of law, our notion of precedent
has become distinctly different from its English roots. In a nutshell,
American precedents are more textual, and relatively less conceptual,
than they were in the past. A precedent in the United States is no
longer simply a decision in a preceding case, but instead consists of
words that have been written on paper by the judge herself and that
have been published in an authoritative source. It is premature to
conclude that judicial opinions have become textualized and are
therefore being interpreted in the way that statutes are. But it is
unquestionably true that lawyers are paying much closer attention to
the exact words of opinions than they did in the past. The words of an
opinion are not evidence of the law, as they once were. They are the
law.
Despite the initial attraction of turning back the clock, we cannot
realistically hope to restore the common law to a state where it resides
in the minds and memory of its practitioners, and where judicial deci-
sions are merely evidence of what the common law is. The world has
changed too much, and we have ventured too far down the road
towards textualization to turn back.
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